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ABSTRACT 
This paper subjects three transactions which are typical in the North 
American jurisdictions to critical comparative analysis in the New Zealand 
and Australian contexts to establish if each transaction is viable by the 
medium of a share buy-back. Problems which will be encountered are 
identified and analysed. 
The three transactions analysed are: 
(1) a buy-back agreement between shareholders and their closely 
held company 
(2) a going private transaction by a listed company 
(3) a systematic on-market repurchase programme by a listed 
company to arbitrage capital costs. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 21,000 words. 
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PURCHASE BY A COMPANY OF ITS OWN 
SHARES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will discuss the 1887 case of Trevor v Whitworth' ,which is the 
genesis of the prohibition against the purchase by a company of its own 
shares and which, until recently, prevailed in all Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. The nature of buy-backs, and some of the purposes for which 
they can be used is then considered and an overview of the different 
approaches taken to share repurchases in New Zealand, Australia and the 
U.S.A. is undertaken. 
The main body of the paper is devoted to a comparative analysis of the 
problems that the new share purchase regimes in New Zealand and 
Australia will present in the context of three particular types of transaction 
on each side of the Tasman. 
The three particular transactions chosen for analysis are: 
(1) a buy back agreement between shareholders and their closely 
held company 
(2) a going private transaction by a listed company (including 
purchase of own shares as a takeover defence) 
(3) a systematic on-market repurchase programme to arbitrage 
capital costs (i.e. monitoring and adjusting the debt to debt 
plus equity financing ratios (gearing adjustments)), or to 
stabilise the share price. 
2. GENESIS OF THE PROHIBITION 
The prohibition at common law against a company purchasing its own 
shares originated with the 1887 decision of the House of Lords in Trevor v 
Whitworth. In that case one of the principals of a company purchased 
(apparently as agent for the company) all of the shares of a deceased 
(1887) 12 App Cas. 409 (HL) 
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shareholder from the latter's executors for a price equal to the original issue 
price of the shares. The company's debt to the deceased shareholder's 
estate was to be paid over a period of 3 years with interest payable on the 
outstanding balance. Before payment in full was achieved, and due to 
trading losses, the company was wound up and the executors of the 
deceased shareholder sought to enforce against the company's liquidators 
the outstanding debt in respect of the share repurchase. 
In the House of Lords it was decided that the principal of the company had 
purchased the shares not in his individual capacity, but as an agent of the 
company. All of their Lordships' judgments rested on the grounds that, 
firstly, a purchase by a company of its own shares was an unsanctioned 
way of avoiding the necessity to comply with the then current statutory 
formalities governing a reduction of capital, and secondly, that buying its 
own shares using the company's own assets, and in a manner not 
specifically authorised by a company's Memorandum of Association, was 
not a power that the company could claim and exercise, regardless of 
whether such a procedure was contemplated by the company's Articles of 
Association. 
In the leading judgment, Lord McNaughton also considered whether such a 
purchase of own shares could be provided for in the company's 
Memorandum of Association. His Lordship rejected this view on the basis 
that such an authorisation could not sit beside the statement of fixed capital 
which appeared also in the Memorandum. 
Three major policy lines can be extracted from the judgments in Trevor: 
2 
(1) the main policy justification was Their Lordships' perception 
that creditors would be put at considerable risk if 
unconstrained purchase by a company of its own shares was 
permitted:2 
Paid up capital may be diminished or lost in the 
course of a company's trading; that as a result no 
legislation can prevent; but persons who deal with, 
and give credit to a limited company, naturally rely 
Supra. n.1 423-424 
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upon the fact that the company is trading with a 
certain amount of capital already paid, as well as upon 
the responsibility of its members for the capital 
remaining at call; and they are entitled to assume that 
no part of the capital which has been paid into the 
coffers of the company have been subsequently paid 
out, except in the legitimate course of its business. 
(2) a share repurchase was fundamentally opposed to the notion 
of a company as a legal entity with a fixed amount of capital 
which could only be increased or decreased as a result of its 
trading activities, or in compliance with the statutory scheme 
for capital reduction. 
(3) repurchase transactions would constitute a method of 
influencing or subverting shareholders' respective rights, 
entitlements and liabilities in a way that could not necessarily 
be constrained by the corporate governance regime 
established by law and by the particular Articles of 
Association of that company. 
The three grounds can thus be summarised as creditor protection, 
preservation of capital maintenance rules, and the prevention of the 
subversion of normal principles of corporate governance. 
As can be seen from the above, the blanket prohibition on share repurchase 
arose in the context of a closely held company buying out a deceased 
shareholder pursuant to a buy-out agreement. Of the many potential 
problems associated with repurchase (i.e. trading in own shares, reduction 
of creditor protection, removal of opposing shareholders using the 
company's assets, and achieving capital reduction without following the set 
statutory formula), the only one of these potential abuses being litigated in 
Trevor was the unauthorised reduction of capital scenario. 
That Their Lordships could have based their judgments on more limited 
technical grounds, but chose a more expansive approach, indicates they 
were clearly aware of the wide range of potential abuses, distortions of 
traditional principles of corporate control and misuse of the company's own 
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assets for purposes which may not be in the best interests of the company 
(as opposed to those of management and/or controlling shareholder/s) that 
a power of repurchasing own shares, using the company's (rather than any 
third party's) assets presaged. 
The judgment was clearly intended to, and did, bury any notions of the 
legitimacy of self-purchase for a very long time. By basing their 
judgments on the three very wide principles identified above, their 
Lordships precluded the possibility of the case being distinguished in later 
cases and limited to its own particular facts. 
3. NATURE AND PURPOSES OF SHARE REPURCHASES 
(i) Nature 
A share repurchase transaction is not limited in effect to sale by one 
party of its shares and the acquisition of those shares by the 
purchaser. As well as a change of ownership of shares, it will also 
act as a redistribution of assets from one party to another ( cash 
and/or non cash consideration from the company to the selling 
shareholder in return for the repurchased shares), and will also alter 
ownership participation, and thus control of a company, except 
where the repurchase is offered and accepted in a pro-rata manner, 
so that each shareholder's proportionate ownership participation and 
(theoretical) share of control is preserved. 
As a distribution of company's assets, a share repurchase transaction 
has the potential to work to the disadvantage of creditors, by 
removing from the company's pool of assets, which are available for 
distribution, a cushion of funds available to satisfy creditors' claims 
against the company. It does this by not only returning fully paid 
up capital (plus any premium over the original purchase price) to 
shareholders but also, in the case of a purchase of partly-paid 
shares, removes the pool of unpaid and uncalled capital which 
would otherwise be available to satisfy creditors' claims in the event 
of liquidation by the liquidator making a call on such partly-paid 
shares and collecting the capital for distribution. 
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So, as a mechanism for distribution of assets, the share repurchase 
transaction can threaten creditors by transferring those company 
assets otherwise available for the settlement of debts out of 
circulation and into the hands of the selling shareholders. 
Because a share repurchase transaction most often functions 
simultaneously as a sale and purchase, a redistribution of assets, and 
a rejinking of ownership participation, it has the potential to be used 
in a wide range of circumstances to achieve a number of very 
different purposes. However, a consequence of its versatility is that 
share repurchase transactions may be exploited by certain 
(management/shareholder) groups in a company to that group's 
advantage and to the disadvantage of another group or groups of 
shareholders, as well as creditors. 
In a sale and purchase context an obvious problem is the availability 
of price sensitive inside information which is only available to 
management or controlling shareholder insiders. Exploitation, 
without disclosure to offerees, of such information is likely to result 
in the movement of assets (shares) to those insiders at a price which 
is less than their true current value. Wealth can thus be 
redistributed from "outsider" shareholders who sell at undervalue to 
insiders. The exchange of values is unequal because the insiders 
have exploited their special knowledge to acquire shares at less than 
the value the market would place on them than if the price sensitive 
information they have was public knowledge and the market could 
value the shares on this basis. 
So, a sale and purchase will often (in a non pro-rata take-up 
situation) result in a change in ownership participation and control 
financed out of company assets which, without full and frank 
disclosure to offeree shareholders, can result in the passage of 
control to insiders for a price much less than selling shareholders 
would rationally be prepared to accept in a fully informed market. 
(ii) Purposes 
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Because of the versatility of the transaction, share repurchases have 
been used to achieve all of the following results in North America:3 
• fulfil buy-out agreements in closely-held companies upon the 
death or retirement of shareholders; 
• eliminate fractional shares (i.e. less than marketable parcels); 
• prevent shares ( or further shares) from being transferred to 
unwelcome outsiders ( e.g. special, non-pro rata offers to 
disaffected members only, or "greenmail" as a defence to a 
takeover); 
• eliminate troublesome shareholders (again, by way of 
targeted, non-pro rata offer); 
• enhance the position of insiders holding large blocks of 
shares (insiders can consolidate or increase control by 
making pro-rata offers to all shareholders without intending 
to take up the offer themselves, thus increasing their 
proportionate stake in the company); 
• delist and/or privatise the company (so-called "going private" 
transactions); 
• reduce the market for, and thus reduce the liquidity of, 
publicly held shares so as to pressure minority shareholders 
into selling their shares (minority "freeze out", particularly in 
the "going private" context); 
• comply with statutory appraisal rights afforded dissident 
shareholders in the cases of mergers and other 
reorganisations (compulsory minority buy-outs); 
• eliminate preferred shares that carry an "unfavourable" 
dividend rate (and therefore reduce overall cost of capital to 
the company by lowering the funding costs of equity); 
• increase the company's debt to debt plus equity ratio; (i.e. 
borrow to buy the shares back= more debt but less equity). 
• comply with court orders for the protection of oppressed 
minority shareholders (compulsory minority buy out); 
• create a market in the shares of an unquoted company so as 
to encourage investment by outsiders (increase investment 
liquidity); 
Dugan and Keef, Company Purchase of Own Shares: The Case for New Zealand, 
Victoria University Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987, 14 
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• reacquire shares from departing employees and thus facilitate 
the administration of an employee share scheme; 
• enable a company to increase its cash reserves by profitable 
speculation on inside information and/or the cyclical 
movement in share prices; (i.e. short-term trading in own 
shares - buy low and sell high on a systematic basis); 
• permit the operation of open-ended investment companies 
(c.f.unit trusts); 
• support the market price for the shares (by creating an 
artificial demand by on-market purchases a signal is given to 
the market that the shares are presently under-valued); 
• increase the net asset backing or earnings per share of 
remaining shares (by reducing the shares on issue the 
remaining shares would be entitled to a proportionately 
greater share of the company's assets available for 
distribution, after settlement of all prior claims, in a winding-
up and would be entitled to a higher dividend per share while 
the company was still trading, on the assumption that the 
amount available to be distributed as a dividend was similar 
to that available before the repurchase, when the dividend 
had to be distributed amongst a greater number of 
shareholders); 
• satisfy options or make acquisitions (i.e. satisfy options in 
relation to employee (executive) share schemes by issuing 
repurchased shares held as treasury stock thus obviating the 
need to issue new shares and thus dilute earnings per share, 
or by using treasury stock as consideration for an acquisition, 
rather than making a cash payment (in the U.S. there was a 
tax advantage to offeree shareholders in structuring a 
takeover in this way) without heavily diluting earnings per 
share); 
• absorb excess corporate cash and drive up the market price of 
shares so as to make a takeover less attractive (by using up 
cash reserves a "golden egg" is removed from the sights of 
takeover predators, and the "buy signal" given by a large on-
market purchase signals to the market that the shares are 
undervalued and are thus a rational buy - so the price of the 
shares goes up, making it a more expensive takeover target); 
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• and lastly, but perhaps not obviously, as an investment (the 
purchase of shares in a well-performing company whose 
business and prospects the Board knows best - its own!). 
4. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REPURCHASE 
APPROACHES IN NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND 
THE U.S.A. 
Matrix charts summarising the legislative conditions applied to buy-backs 
in New Zealand and Australia are contained in Appendices 1 and 2, as is a 
brief descriptive analysis of the provisions themselves. 
In both New Zealand and (to a much greater degree) in Australia a 
prescriptive approach has been taken whereby numerous conditions and 
procedures are stipulated in respect of buy-backs generally and also in 
respect of the separate categories of buy-backs identified in the legislation. 
Both the New Zealand and Australian legislation, the Companies Act 1993 
(N.Z.) sections 58-67 and 107, and Division 4B of Part 2.4 of the 
Corporations Act 1989 respectively, provide, inter alia, for the following 
specific types of buy-back: 
( 1) Pro-rata ( or pari passu) proportional offers 
(2) Selective/special offers (targeted offers) 
(3) On-market offers 
and prescribe separate procedures for each, which are designed to prevent 
potential abuses of the repurchase mechanism which have been identified 
as occurring in overseas jurisdictions, most notably the U.S.A., where 
repurchase has been available for decades. 
The prescriptive approach can be contrasted with the permissive approach 
adopted in American state jurisdictions, where the basic corporations law 
does not provide a separate regime for repurchases, but rather treats them 
as a distribution (such as a dividend) and subjects them to a solvency test -
usually only a single limb liquidity based test which states that the 
mcc316 
9 
distribution can be made (shares repurchased) if the purchasing company 
will remain able to pay its debts as they fall due in the ordinary course of 
business after the distribution (repurchase) has been effected. 
In New Zealand there is also a solvency test applied to all repurchases. 
The New Zealand test is two-limbed, with both a liquidity limb (as in the 
U.S.A.) and also a so-called balance sheet limb, whereby the value of the 
company's assets must be greater than the value of its liabilities, including 
contingent liabilities, after the distribution/repurchase. Australia also 
applies a (single liquidity limb) solvency test to all repurchases. 
To prevent abuses of the repurchase power, American jurisdictions also 
rely on directors' fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith and acting for a 
proper purpose to further the best interests of the company. 
Additionally, and superimposed on this empowering framework in the 
U.S.A., the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") has formulated a 
number of specific rules relating to certain types of buy-backs which are 
perceived to be particularly susceptible to abuse (e.g. "going private" 
transactions), and to certain practices such as share price rigging, which 
apply to companies required to be registered under the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934, i.e. companies with total assets of over $1million and a class of 
shares held by 750 or more persons. In respect of on-market purchases the 
State stock exchanges also impose their own listing requirements to ensure 
that the market is kept fully and fairly informed of all information relating 
to listed securities of its members which could affect a decision to buy or 
sell those securities and the price at which they may be acquired or sold. 
Clearly the prescriptive approach adopted in New Zealand and Australia 
(and the U.K.) is very different to the permissive empowering approach 
adopted in the U.S.A., where a solvency test and directors' fiduciary duties 
are primarily relied upon to regulate repurchase transactions. 
As will be seen in the following transactional analysis, a prescriptive 
approach creates all sorts of problems and hurdles for legitimate 
repurchase transactions while failing to provide proper protective 
mechanisms to prevent abusive repurchase transactions. A clear example 
is going-private transactions, which can be effected through the more 
mcc316 
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loosely regulated pro-rata offer procedure or through the special offer 
procedure, where directors must certify that the transaction is in the best 
interests of the company and the remaining shareholders. Remaining 
shareholders are the very group that, through their ability to exploit inside 
information to their exclusive advantage, will invariably be better off after 
the transaction where the company's (not the insiders') assets have been 
used to acquire control, usually by purchasing its own shares at a 
substantial undervalue. 
5. SPECIFIC TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
This part of the paper will take three transactions which are commonly 
associated with purchase of own shares in the North American 
jurisdictions, and will subject those transactions to analysis under the New 
Zealand and Australian provisions to establish if they can be effected in 
each jurisdiction. 
If the transaction is possible in both jurisdictions, I will consider which 
jurisdiction's provisions enable the transaction in question to be performed 
in the most efficient and cost effective manner, while also offering 
protection against any abuses. 
The three particular transactions that will be covered in this part of the 
paper are: 
mcc316 
( 1) a buy back agreement between shareholders and their closely 
held company 
(2) a going private transaction by a listed company (including 
the use of purchase of own shares as a takeover defence in 
the going private context) 
(3) a systematic on-market repurchase programme by a listed 
company to arbitrage capital costs (i.e. monitoring and 
adjusting the debt to debt plus equity financing ratios 
(gearing adjustments)), or to stabilise the share price. 
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1. SHAREHOLDER BUY OUT AGREEMENT IN A CLOSELY 
HELD COMPANY 
(a) New Zealand 
In the North American jurisdictions, where share repurchase has been 
permitted for several decades, a major use to which the technique is put is 
to enable shareholders in closely held companies to effect an agreement 
whereby upon a certain trigger event, such as retirement or death, the 
company's assets will be used to purchase the shares of the exiting 
shareholder. 
Such agreements form a convenient mechanism for the return of capital 
and a share of the profits to retiring shareholders in a situation where there 
is no liquid market for the shares. The use of company funds to effect the 
buy-out agreement means that the remaining shareholders do not have to 
provide, or borrow, the cash to purchase the retiring shareholder's stake. 
Another consequence of buy-out agreements is that a shareholder who 
wishes to exit the company is not tempted (in the absence of the almost 
universal "pre-emptive rights" clause in the company's Articles of 
Association) to sell his or her shareholding to an outside third party. In the 
absence of the agreed exit strategy which a buy-back agreement represents, 
and also a pre-emptive rights clause, a departing shareholder could use the 
threat of sale to an unfriendly /unknown third party as leverage against the 
remaining shareholders to pay a premium for the acquisition of the 
shareholding that it would not command if valued without the presence of 
the coercive premium element. 
In short then, buy-out agreements are a convenient method of providing a 
certain market for the shares of a departing shareholder in a closely held 
company, where the remaining shareholders wish to keep the shareholding 
closely held and the departing shareholder requires the certainty of being 
able to extract the capital he or she has injected and any increase in value 
of the firm over the relevant period without having to, effectively, put the 
share parcel up for tender to the highest bidder, if any bidder is available, 
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serendipitously, at the time that the exiting shareholder wishes to leave the 
company. 
The growth of so-called direct investment companies in New Zealand -
companies set up solely to invest in private companies - may ease this 
liquidity problem in the future. More than $250 billion is invested 
overseas in private equities. In the United States major funds have more 
than 6% of their total assets in direct investment, but in New Zealand the 
figure is less than 1 %.4 
The shareholder entering into such an agreement requires that the 
agreement is certain and enforceable right from the time that it is 
concluded, and will want to be certain that the terms of the bargain struck 
cannot be changed at the whim of a majority of the other shareholders. 
Under the Companies Act 1993 the most intuitively appealing way to 
implement such a buy-out agreement would be by way of a unanimous 
agreement under section 107(1)(c), since any agreement reached under 
section 107 in relation to a repurchase would not be subject to the 
numerous requirements contained in sections 58 to 65, which are 
considered below. 
A section 107(1)(c) unanimous agreement may (pursuant to section 107 
(5)) be either: 
(a) a separate agreement to, or concurrence in, the particular 
exercise of the power referred to; or 
(b) an agreement to, or concurrence in, the exercise of the power 
generally, or from time to time. 
To be valid and enforceable the agreement must be in writing (section 
107( 4 )). 
It could be argued that a written agreement under section 107(5)(a) appears 
to contemplate a repurchase transaction contemporaneous with, or close in 
time to, the agreement or concurrence, but it is submitted that the better 
4 The Independent, 7 October 1994, 35 
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view is that section 107(5)(a) is not so limited, and could be used to effect 
a long-range buy-out agreement. An agreement under section 107(5)(b) 
clearly contemplates the periodic exercise of the power at times in the 
future. 
If a section 107(5)(a) agreement does contemplate a particular exercise of 
the buy-out power which is not limited to a buy-out contemporaneously 
with, or close in time to, the agreement or concurrence then this would 
provide a suitable vehicle for a buy-out agreement because the only 
resolution and certification required would be as to solvency, and there is 
no ability to withdraw agreement, as is the case under a section 107(5)(b) 
type agreement. 
If only the section 107(5)(b) procedure is available then there is a major 
problem . . 
Section 107(6) effectively enables shareholders entering into a section 
107(5)(b) unanimous agreement to have a "bob each way", by permitting 
them to withdraw from the agreement at any time. This immediate right of 
withdrawal from the agreement makes the procedure under section 
107(5)(b) inappropriate to effect a buy-out agreement because there is no 
certainty for the shareholder whose shares are to be acquired that the 
agreement will not be rendered ineffective at some time in the future by the 
withdrawal of one or more of the other parties to that agreement. 
It is not obvious why section 107(6) appears in the Act. The whole scheme 
of section 107 is to provide a method of consensual contracting out of 
certain requirements of the Act. To permit a unilateral withdrawal from 
such an agreement freely entered into appears to provide an unjustifiable 
departure from the normal rules of contract that an agreement freely 
entered into, and in the absence of fraud, is enforceable against the party 
undertaking the obligation unless the other party to the contract agrees 
otherwise, and notwithstanding that circumstances may have changed since 
the agreement was entered into. 
A typical buy-out agreement will provide a pre-emptive provision whereby 
if an exiting shareholder desires to sell his or her shares he will fust offer 
them to the company, and also a provision that upon the death, notified 
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retirement or other specified conditions then the company unequivocably 
agrees to purchase the shares of the departing shareholder at a price to be 
determined in a specified manner. 
Alternatives for determining the price to be paid for the exiting 
shareholder's shares could be to determine the net asset backing of the 
shares at the time that the buy-out agreement is first concluded, and then 
provide for an annual reassessment at the time that the company's annual 
report is prepared. Thus the price determined at the time that the latest 
annual report is prepared, immediately before the exiting shareholder is to 
depart, will provide the price to be paid for the shares. Another, possibly 
less cumbersome method, would be to provide an independent valuation of 
the shares to be performed. 
In relation to the timing and method of payment, it is unlikely that a 
company will be able to completely cash out a departing shareholder in one 
hit. It is far more likely that a form of instalment payment arrangement 
will be entered into. The frequency, timing and duration of such 
instalment payments will depend on the cash flow profile of a company, 
retained earnings available for distribution, and generally the working 
capital requirements necessary to keep the business operating as a 
profitable going concern. 
If an instalment arrangement is entered into, then clearly the solvency test 
must be satisfied before each and every instalment payment is made. 
While, on its face, this is a reasonable requirement, this does raise the 
prospect that a majority of the remaining shareholders could manipulate 
the financial affairs of the company, by stripping assets, or creating 
liabilities, such that instalment payments (distributions) under the buy-out 
agreement will not be able to be made, as they would appear to cause the 
insolvency of the company. So, in a sense, any departing shareholder faces 
the prospect of having the sword of Damocles over his or her head every 
time an instalment comes up for payment. 
If the shares remain vested in the exiting shareholder until all of the 
instalments are paid in full, as may sometimes be the case, this would 
mean that the voting rights attaching to the shares would also remain with 
the exiting shareholder, or if he or she is deceased, with his or her personal 
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representatives who will often have no knowledge of the business or 
particular business skills. In the latter circumstances decision-making 
ability in the company could be very badly affected, in some cases 
affecting the viability of the business itself. If the exiting shareholder is 
still alive, the ability to exercise voting rights could provide a potential 
lever over the remaining shareholders to extract un-bargained for 
concessions or advantages in return for compliance in voting or other 
company administration or decision-making pattern. An obvious example 
would be a refusal to go along with the majority in matters requiring 
unanimous consent to take advantage of the section 107 contracting out 
provisions in relation to, for example, payment of dividends (section 
107(1)(a)) or loans or other payments to directors under section 161 
(section 107(1)(f)). 
Also, if the exiting shareholder continues to hold at least 25% of the voting 
power he or she could block all special resolutions, including those 
necessary to sanction the entering into of "major transactions" under the 
Act. 
Given the undesirability of the above, it would seem preferable for the 
shares (and the voting rights) to be cancelled or held as non-voting treasury 
shares immediately to enable the remaining shareholders to carry on the 
business as they see fit, and to convert the exiting shareholder's stake from 
an equity holding to a debt investment, secured over the assets of the 
company to the extent possible, and subject to any existing statutory 
subordination of priorities in favour of other company creditors. 
Turning now to the share repurchase provisions themselves, it appears that 
the only two options which may be available to effect a buy-out agreement 
would be sections 60 and 61. Under section 60(1)(a) a pro-rata offer 
could, theoretically, be made to all the shareholders in the closely held 
company, with the intention being that only the proposed departing 
shareholder take up the offer. Section 60(2)(a) permits the company to 
acquire additional shares from a shareholder to the extent that another 
shareholder does not accept the offer, or accepts the offer only in part. In 
this case only the departing shareholder would be selling, so the shares not 
taken up from the remaining shareholders could be purchased from the 
exiting shareholder. 
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Unfortunately, the Board may only make such a pro-rata offer if it has 
previously resolved pursuant to section 60(3) that: 
(i) the acquisition is in the best interests of the company; and 
(ii) the terms of the offer and the consideration offered for the 
shares are fair and reasonable to the company; and 
(iii) it is not aware of inside information. 
Pursuant to section 52 the Board must also resolve and certify that in their 
opinion the company will, immediately after the distribution, satisfy the 
solvency test. 
The resolutions required by section 60(3) clearly contemplate a purchase of 
shares in the near future. This is completely inappropriate in the context of 
a buy-out agreement where the buy-out will not occur until some time far 
in the future. In these circumstances it is impossible to certify 
prospectively that the acquisition will be in the best interests of the 
company, that the terms of the off er and consideration offered will be fair 
and reasonable to the company, that the Board will not be aware of any 
inside information and that the company will still be solvent after the 
repurchase! The financial situation of the company, and the economy in 
general, may change so much in the period between the conclusion of the 
buy-out agreement and the time when the agreement is to be effected and 
the purchase made that the resolutions may no longer be true and accurate. 
All the directors could do in these circumstances was certify the matters as 
at the time that the agreement was entered into. 
The section 60(l)(a) pro-rata offer procedure could, of course, be used at 
the time that the departing shareholder intended to leave the company, but 
this is unsatisfactory from the point of view of the departing shareholder 
because it does not provide the necessary ex-ante certainty required by a 
shareholder in this position, who requires a guaranteed exit strategy from 
the company. Market circumstances, and business relationships, may also 
have changed so much in the interim that the departing shareholder may 
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not be able to rely on the full support of the Board to enter into such a 
transaction at the time when he or she needs to exit. 
The other possibilities are a special offer in terms of either section 
60(1)(b)(i) or (ii). Section 60(1)(b)(i) provides that an offer can be made 
to one or more shareholders to acquire shares if the offer is one to which 
all shareholders have consented in writing. On its face, this appears to be 
similar to the section 107(5)(a) unanimous agreement provision. However, 
the resolutions required by section 60(3) (discussed above) also apply to an 
offer under section 60(1 )(b )(i), so that this method also would not be 
available to effect a buy-out agreement. 
Under section 60(1)(b)(ii) an offer to one or more shareholders can be 
made if it is expressly permitted by the constitution and is made in 
accordance with the special offer procedure set out in section 61. Section 
61(1) requires that the Board may only make an offer under section 
60(1)(b )(ii) if it has previously resolved: 
(i) that the acquisition is of benefit to the remaining 
shareholders; and 
(ii) that the terms of the offer and the consideration offered for 
the shares are fair and reasonable to the remaining 
shareholders. 
These resolutions are in addition to the resolutions required by section 
60(3). 
Again, clearly, these are inappropriate requirements which cannot be 
complied with in the context of a prospective buy-out agreement. These 
matters can only be certified to in any accurate and meaningful way very 
close to the time that the buy-out is to be effected. These matters cannot 
be certified to many years in advance and still comply with the 
requirements of the Act. 
A further "deal breaker" is that under section 61 ( 6) the off er to purchase 
must be made not less than 10 working days and not more than 12 months 
after the disclosure document (required by section 61(5)) has been sent to 
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each shareholder. Twelve months is an impractical event horizon in the 
context of a proposed long-term buy-out agreement. 
In essence then, a buy-out agreement in a closely held company could only 
be implemented under one of the four off-market modes discussed above, 
namely a section 107(5)(a) unanimous agreement. In the case of a section 
107(5)(b) unanimous agreement, the agreement can be broken at any time, 
and, in the case of the pro-rata and special offer procedures, those 
procedures contemplate that the acquisition of the shares will be effected in 
close proximity to the time of the actual offer. The required resolutions 
cannot sensibly be made and certified at the time of the entering into of the 
agreement, but only when the buy-out is to be performed some time in the 
future. 
Given this, there is no certainty for the prospective departing shareholder 
because the enforceability of the buy-out agreement would depend on the 
Board's views of the company's best interests at the time of the member's 
retirement. Since the best interest test applies at the time of performance 
the remaining shareholders could easily prevent the company from 
performing its obligations under the buy-out agreement by refusing to 
certify. 
The position of a shareholder seeking to enter into a buy-out agreement is 
improved if the only requirement to be met is the general solvency 
requirement set out in section 52 of the Act relating to distributions; the 
position under a section 107(5)(a) agreement. But even with the solvency 
test remaining as the sole hurdle, intransigent or disaffected remaining 
shareholders could, through a variety of techniques, artificially manipulate 
the financial position of the company, in the years or months leading up to 
the date when the buy out agreement was to be performed, so that the 
company's financial position was such that they could not certify that the 
solvency test could be met at the time fixed for the buy-out. 
A further issue that impacts upon buy-out agreements under the Act is the 
statutory subordination in sections 67(3) of the Act, of an unpaid seller 
under a repurchase transaction to the claims of other creditors, but in 
priority to the other shareholders. Given the multitudinous protections in 
the Act which are designed to prevent abuses of the share repurchase 
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power, and in particular the necessity to "pass" the solvency test, it is 
difficult to justify this statutory subordination. 
It is submitted that it would be preferable for claims of unpaid sellers to be 
treated as an equal priority to claims of any other creditor of the company. 
This is particularly the case given that rather than contributing equity 
capital, a shareholder could contribute a nominal sum by way of subscribed 
capital, with the bulk of their financial contribution to the running costs of 
the company being provided by way of a loan secured in the normal way, 
by floating charge or mortgage. 
If most of the funds were contributed by shareholders way of loan secured 
by a charge then the shareholders, in their guise as creditors of the 
company, would be entitled to a priority over other unsecured creditors, 
but most usually second in priority to a bank or other financial institution 
which provides the bulk of the funding under a floating charge or first 
mortgage security. If, however, a different capital structure was chosen 
whereby the funds were injected as paid up capital then the unpaid 
shareholder on a repurchase would rank after unsecured creditors. This 
result seems quixotic and unjustifiable. 
In this regard it must be noted that in the Australian context, section 133 R 
D (ranking of seller's claim in winding up) is subordinated (in a similar 
fashion to section 67 (3) of the Companies Act 1993 (N .Z.)) to the rights of 
all other creditors, but retains a priority over claims of shareholders in a 
winding up; again, an unsatisfactory situation for an exiting shareholder. 
In conclusion, it seems clear that despite share repurchase being utilised 
extensively overseas to provide for buy-out agreements in closely held 
companies, only one of the New Zealand provisions are suitable to effect 
this type of transaction, namely a section 107(5)(a) unanimous shareholder 
agreement. 
The focus of the core New Zealand provisions is on a repurchase which 
occurs shortly after resolutions have been made authorising the repurchase 
and certifying as to the various matters described above. In a buy-out 
agreement the performance of the contract will usually not take place for 
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some years until after the buy-out agreement has been entered into, making 
any attempted initial certification meaningless. 
In addition to the section 107(5)(a) procedure the only other way to 
provide for a type of buy-out agreement appears to be by using the 
redeemable preference share provisions in the Act, a technique that was 
used to effect this type of transaction before the 1993 Act came into force. 
It seems rather ironic that due to the shortcomings of the new share 
repurchase provisions, shareholders wishing to obtain the ex-ante certainty 
of a guaranteed exit strategy from a company some years down the track, 
and who, for whatever reason, do not consider the section 107(5)(a) 
procedure appropriate, or who cannot achieve the required unanimity to 
conclude a section 107(5)(a) agreement, must use the same techniques 
they did before the reforming legislation was passed. 
Redeemable Shares 
In many respects the provisions on redemption of shares in the Companies 
Act 1993 in relation to shares which are redeemable at the option of the 
company parallel the provisions on share repurchase, seeking as they do to 
prevent the same perceived abuses of the procedure, and, accordingly, the 
same type of problems identified above apply. 
Section 68 of the Act makes a distinction between shares which are 
redeemable: 
(a) at the option of the company; or 
(b) at the option of the holder of the share; or 
( c) on a date specified in the constitution ......... . 
In respect of shares redeemable at the option of the holder of the share, or 
shares redeemable on a date specified in the constitution, sections 74 and 
75 of the Act are in practically identical terms in providing that when the 
share becomes redeemable, either because the holder of the share has given 
proper notice to the company to redeem the shares on a particular date, or 
the specified date for redemption comes around, then: 
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(a) the company must redeem the share on that date; and 
(b) the share is deemed to be cancelled on that date; and 
( c) from that date the former shareholder ranks as an unsecured 
creditor of the company for the sum payable on redemption. 
Furthermore, a redemption effected under section 7 4 or 7 5 is not classified 
as a distribution for the purposes of the solvency test, because redeemable 
preference shares are more akin to debt instruments than equity shares and, 
accordingly, any redemption is in the nature of the repayment of a loan, not 
a distribution of company capital. Also, the terms of redemption are set 
when the shares are issued and so creditors looking to the company should, 
theoretically, have the ability to inform themselves of the contingent 
liability which the redeemable preference share represent, before agreeing 
to lend to the company. 
Rather, a redemption is deemed to be a distribution for the purposes of 
section 56, which relates to recovery of distributions made to a shareholder 
at a time when the company did not, immediately after the distribution, 
satisfy the solvency test. In effect then, while the redemption does not 
have to pass the solvency test before a pay out is made, if it subsequently 
transpires that the company was insolvent after the distribution then that 
distribution can be recovered. Effectively, the application of the section 56 
recovery procedure treats redemptions while insolvent as voidable 
preferences, and thus recoverable for the benefit of all creditors. 
By using the redeemable preference share mechanism under section 74 or 
75 the particular certification requirements that are present in the context 
of purchase of own shares can be avoided. For the reasons noted above, 
the solvency test does not have to be passed and certified to and there is 
also no necessity to certify in respect of the proposed redemption being in 
the best interests of the company, that the consideration is fair and 
reasonable either to the company or the remaining shareholders, and also 
that the Board is not aware of any inside information. The resolutions 
required in relation to issue of redeemable shares are concluded at the time 
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the shares are issued. It is inappropriate that they be repeated before any 
proposed redemption can be effected. 
As an exit strategy, the redeemable share provisions could be used to 
structure the buy-out agreement so that the shares were redeemable either 
at the option of the exiting shareholder (i.e. upon retirement or any other 
particular event), or they could be triggered by a particular event such as 
the death or disablement of that shareholder. Given the parallels between 
section 74 and 75 it would appear that a shareholder wishing to use either 
of these avenues would not be disadvantaged by choosing either option. A 
formality applicable to both section 74 and 75 is that the company's 
constitution must provide for the redemption of the share by that company. 
This could be provided for either in the original constitution of the 
company or by amendment at a later date, following the amendment 
procedures contained in the constitution. Such an arrangement should 
operate in a very similar manner to buy-out agreements under North 
American practice which use a purchase of own shares as the vehicle for 
the buy-out agreement. 
On its face then this procedure would seem to be ideal. However, 
problems with the procedure are the fact that since the redemption of the 
shares and the mechanisms relating thereto are contained in the 
constitution of the company, these provisions will most likely be able to be 
altered, subject to the terms of the constitution, by a three-quarter majority 
special resolution, and in the absence of some other super-majority or 
unanimity requirement which is applied specifically to the terms of issue 
and redemption of the preference shares. In some circumstances, e.g. 
where there are only two or three shareholders, then clearly the exiting 
shareholder will always (and in the absence of the super-majority or 
unanimity requirement in the constitution, referred to above) be in a 
position to block the passage of such an amending resolution. However in 
a situation where shares are held in unequal portions, or where shares are 
held in equal portions but there are more than three shareholders, then the 
required ex-ante certainty from the point of view of the exiting shareholder 
may not be present. 
The claim of a shareholder whose shares have not yet been (fully) 
redeemed under section 74 or 75 is treated as un unsecured creditor 
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(sections 74(1)(c), 75(1)(c). In this regard a buy-out agreement concluded 
under the redeemable share provisions provides greater protection to an 
exiting shareholder than under a section 107(5)(a) unanimous agreement in 
the event of a winding-up because the unpaid sums are accorded priority 
over shareholders ' claims, as unsecured debts. Under a section 107(5)(a) 
agreement unpaid sums rank after unsecured debts on a winding up. 
As noted above, shares redeemable at the option of the company are 
subject to rules which are substantially like those applicable to a purchase 
of own shares (because the company can decide when to redeem them) and 
therefore make them an inappropriate method of effecting a buy-out 
arrangement. 
(b) Australia 
Close Corporations Act 1989 
The starting point for any discussion of buy-out agreements in closely held 
companies in an Australian context is the Close Corporations Act 1989. 
As of October 1994, the Act had still not been proclaimed to come into 
force. 
The Act is designed to cater for up to 10 shareholders to operate in a less 
formal, quasi partnership, structure than a larger company formed under 
the Corporations Act. In exchange for a less formal and less flexible 
business structure, close corporations are not permitted to offer their shares 
for subscription to the public. 
Part 10 of the Act provides for matters relating to shares. Division One 
deals with the acquisition by the close corporation of its own shares. 
Section 87 provides that a close corporation is not to acquire any shares or 
units in itself except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. A close 
corporation may acquire its own shares if the requirements of sections 89-
92 have been complied with. However, any acquisition by a close 
corporation of its own shares is not invalidated by an acquisition in 
contravention of the Act's provisions. 
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Section 89 provides that a "decisive number" of members must have, 
within six months before the acquisition: 
(a) consented in writing to the acquisition; and 
(b) signed a declaration in writing that they have made an 
inquiry into the affairs of the Corporation and have formed 
the opinion that the Corporation will after making any 
payment to the acquisition of the shares, be able to pay its 
debts as and when they become due. A member must have 
reasonable grounds for the opinion expressed in the 
declaration. 
It can be seen that unlike the solvency test in the New Zealand Companies 
Act 1993, the Close Corporations Act declaration has a single limb relating 
to liquidity, not a dual limb relating to both liquidity and balance sheet 
solvency. 
By virtue of section 90, after a declaration of solvency has been made any 
member who signed the declaration and subsequently has reason to believe 
that the Corporation is or may be unable to pay its debts when they become 
due may withdraw from participation in the declaration of solvency. 
Section 91 provides for the publication of a notice of proposed acquisition 
of the shares by the close corporation. After the declaration of solvency 
has been signed, the corporation must publish a notice in all of the areas 
where it carries on business: 
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(a) stating that the corporation proposes to acquire the shares 
three weeks after the date specified in the notice, being a date 
that is not earlier than seven days after the publication of the 
notice; 
(b) specifying the amount to be paid for the shares; 
(c) stating that a declaration of solvency has been made and is 
available for inspection at the registered office of the 
corporation; and 
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( d) setting out the fact that any creditor who, at the date provided 
in the notice, is entitled to any debt or claim which, if the 
date for the commencement of the winding up of the 
corporation, would be admitted in proof against the 
corporation may apply to the court for an injunction 
restraining the corporation from acquiring the shares. 
This public notice procedure, with the attendant risk of creditor injunctive 
claims to frustrate a buy-out payment, clearly detracts from the Act's utility 
to effect a certain buy-out agreement. 
Section 92 provides that any shares acquired by a close corporation in itself 
must be cancelled. The close corporation is not entitled to re-issue any 
shares so acquired, and any re-issue of shares is void. 
An immediate problem which arises from the perspective of a shareholder 
in a close corporation seeking to enter into a certain and binding agreement 
with the corporation to acquire his or her shares at some time in the future, 
is the provision of section 89 which requires that a decisive number of 
members must have within 6 months before the acquisition, consented in 
writing to the acquisition and signed the solvency declaration. With the six 
months event horizon, it doesn't appear that an agreement can be entered 
into under the section which would provide the necessary ex-ante certainty 
for an acquisition at some time in the quite distant future. 
Part 7 of the Act deals with the internal administration of close 
corporations. Section 67 provides that all of the members of a close 
corporation may enter into a written agreement between themselves 
relating to the management of the affairs of the corporation. The 
agreement is called an association agreement, and the association 
agreement may be varied at any time by a written suplementary association 
agreement or by written supplementary association agreements. A written 
supplementary association agreement may be made if such agreement is 
entered into by a decisive number of members. An association agreement 
is binding on every person who is from time to time a member, including a 
person who became a member after the agreement was entered into, and a 
supplementary association agreement is binding on every person who is 
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from time to time a member, even if the person was a member when the 
agreement was entered into, but did not enter into the agreement, and also 
includes a person who became a member after the agreement was entered 
into. 
The association agreement is designed to operate as the Articles of a 
normal company. As such the association agreement mechanism would be 
inappropriate for concluding a binding long-term buy-out agreement in a 
closely held company. It can be seen from the above that, just like Articles 
of Association, the agreement can be altered by a "decisive number" of 
members. Decisive numbers of members are defined in Division 2 of the 
Act as: 
(a) where there is only one member - that member; 
(b) where there are two members - both of those members; or 
( c) where there are more than two members - not fewer than: 
(i) if there are three members - two members; 
(ii) if there are four members - three members; 
(iii) if there are five members - four members; 
(iv) if there are six members - five members; 
(v) if there are seven or eight members - six members; 
(vi) if there are nine members - seven members; or 
(vii) if there are ten members - eight members. 
So, it is true that when there are more than two members then more than a 
bare majority is required to change an association agreement, but this will 
still not provide the necessary ex-ante certainty to conclude a long range 
buy-out agreement, unless a higher threshold vote than a "decisive 
number" can be negotiated by the existing shareholder, e.g. a unanimity 
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requirement for any changes to the association agreement, but the Act does 
not appear to permit this, premised, as it appears to be, on the will of the 
(super) majority prevailing. A strong argument can thus be made that the 
policy of the Act is not to permit a minority to frustrate the workings of the 
close corporation - something a unanimity requirement would certainly do. 
This is particularly the case when the provisions relating to association 
agreements are read together with the separate requirement in section 89(1) 
of the Act, referred to above, that within six months before the acquisition 
a decisive number of members must also have consented in writing to the 
acquisition. For these reasons it is submitted that the Close Corporations 
Act probably does not provide a suitable mechanism to conclude a long-
range buy-out agreement. 
Consequently even if the Close Corporation's Act 1999 is finally 
proclaimed to come into force, it will still be necessary to consider the 
buy-back provisions in Division 4B of Chapter 2 of the Corporations law. 
Division 4B of Part 2.4 
The Division 4B of Part 2.4 share repurchase provisions make a distinction 
between self purchases by public and proprietary companies. In the 
context of a consideration of a buy-out agreement in a closely held 
company, it is only appropriate to consider the repurchase provisions as 
they relate to smaller proprietary companies. The three possible options 
appear to be a purchase under a buy-back scheme (pro-rata offer) under 
subdivision F, a purchase of employee shares under subdivision H, or a 
selective (special/targeted) buy-back under subdivision J. 
In relation to a buy-back scheme, as well as in relation to a selective buy-
back, and an employee share purchase, section 133DA requires that the 
buy-back be authorised in the Articles of the company. As discussed 
above, any provision contained in the Articles is susceptible to removal or 
amendment by either a majority or a super majority, depending on the 
conditions applying to those Articles. This mutability of the Articles 
makes them an inappropriate vehicle to provide a prospective departing 
shareholder's necessary ex-ante certainty, unless the Articles provide the 
necessity for unanimity to alter the relevant Article, or near enough to 
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unanimity to enable the exiting shareholder to block any proposed changes, 
and that provision is itself subject to a unanimity requirement - a form of 
"double entrenchment". 
A declaration of solvency is also required in relation to buy-back schemes 
(section 133MA) selective buy-backs (section 133MB), and employee 
share purchases (section 133MB). The comprehensive requirements of 
such a solvency declaration are contained in section 133BH. The term 
"solvent" is defined in section 95A to mean that a company is solvent if, 
and only if, it can pay its debts as and when they fall due and payable. 
Any solvency declaration made by each director remains in force for a 
period of 12 months, starting on the day on which it is made, unless it is 
earlier revoked under section 133MD. Subdivision M sets out in detail the 
solvency requirements applying to all types of buy-backs. 
Once again, a solvency requirement necessarily detracts from the certainty 
of a long-range buy-out agreement. However, it is submitted that in all 
cases a declaration of solvency should be a pre-requisite in respect of any 
type of buy-out, including one intended to be effected under a buy-out 
agreement in a closely held company. 
In relation to a proprietary company, if the proposed buy-back is to exceed 
the so-called 10% in 12 months limit then an audited solvency declaration 
is required (section 133MA). This is a solvency declaration provided by 
the Board which is audited and a certificate provided by an independent 
auditor. If the 10/12 limit is exceeded in respect of a selective buy-back or 
an employee share purchase buy-back by a proprietary company then an 
audited solvency declaration is also required in these instances (section 
133MB). Clearly in the case of small proprietary companies the 
requirement for an independently audited solvency declaration will often 
be impractical, arguably adding significant and unnecessary complexity 
and transaction costs. 
In the case of a buy-back scheme an ordinary resolution of shareholders is 
required to be passed if the 10/12 limit is exceeded, or a takeover is 
pending or remains open at the time of the offer (section 133GA). In the 
case of an employee share purchase, an ordinary resolution is also required 
in these circumstances (section 133HA). If the buy-back is a selective 
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buy-back (as it will be under a buy-out agreement) then there is also a 
special 75/75 majority resolution requirement if the 10/12 limit is exceeded 
(section 133JB). 
It follows that unless the buy-out agreement is structured as an instalment 
repayment over a number of years then in many instances the 10% in 12 
months limit will be exceeded such that either an ordinary resolution (buy-
back scheme or employee share purchase), or a special resolution (selective 
buy-back) will be required to authorise the repurchase. In a two person 
company the 10% in 12 months limit would require a pay back period of 
five years to fully pay for the shares proposed to be repurchased from an 
exiting shareholder. Clearly this is impracticable and the final pay back 
period in most buy out agreements would ideally be significantly shorter 
than this. 
The same problems discussed above in relation to the necessity for the 
solvency test to be passed in New Zealand before each instalment payment 
is made to an exiting shareholder apply equally in the Australian context, 
with the potential existing for a majority of the remaining shareholders to 
manipulate the company's financials, or strip its assets, so that a payment 
cannot be made without, apparently, rendering the company insolvent. In 
particular, section 133 RB(2) provides that a buy-back agreement cannot 
be enforced unless the company will remain solvent for at least 12 months 
after the payment is made for the shares under the buy-back agreement. 
Where repayment instalments are to be made monthly then clearly the 
potential effect of these successive instalment payments must also be 
considered each time an instalment falls due for payment. 
An added frisson of terror for certifying directors is that if the company 
does become insolvent within 12 months of any successive declaration of 
solvency, (apparently whether or not the insolvency can be traced back 
directly to that particular payment, or is the result of other unrelated 
payments or matters) then each certifying director is personally liable to 
indemnify the company for the full amounts of distributions paid out 
during the 12 month period prior to the insolvency (section 133QC), 
subject to the defence that at the time the solvency declaration was signed 
the director had reasonable grounds for his or her belief, and did not 
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subsequently have any reason to no longer consider those reasonable 
grounds for belief still existed (section 133QC(6)). 
From the prospective departing shareholder's perspective, a problem with 
the ordinary (pro-rata or employee buy-back) or special (selective buy-
back) resolution procedure required where the 10% in 12 months limit is to 
be exceeded is that any buy-out agreement could be frustrated by a 
majority, or where applicable, a super majority of shareholders refusing to 
vote in favour of the resolution. This is no problem if the departing 
shareholder is a controlling shareholder and can muster the necessary votes 
to pass the ordinary or special resolution, but in most instances in relation 
to closely held company a departing shareholder will not be able to muster 
the required majority. This requirement therefore makes the share 
repurchase provisions an inappropriate and ineffective mechanism to 
provide a satisfactory means of concluding a buy-out agreement in a 
closely held company, unless agreement to a requirement for unanimity for 
changes to the relevant Article can be extracted by the exiting shareholder 
from the remaining shareholders at the time, or before, the buy-out 
agreement is concluded. 
A further potential problem is that the buy-back authorisation must be 
contained in the Articles and must be renewed at least every three years 
(sections 133DA, 133DB). Subject to the comments above, both of these 
provisions are also vulnerable to change - the authorisation could be 
removed or modified at any time, or not renewed when due. 
Another complicating factor is that subdivision L provides a procedure 
whereby creditors may object to proposed buy-backs. The sections 
contained in this subdivision provide for a procedure to advertise buy-
backs by the publication of a notice containing details of the buy-backs, 
and a solvency declaration. Notice must be circulated either nationally or 
in the area in which the company operates (section 133 LC). Any creditor 
may apply to the court for an injunction to stop the proposed buy-back 
(section 133LD), and the court may prohibit the buy-back if it is satisfied 
that either the company is insolvent or that a solvency declaration specified 
in the notice is no longer in force, or it is unlikely that the company will 
remain solvent if the buy-out is effected (section 133LE). The 
administrative burden and expense of providing a notice should not 
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provide an insuperable difficulty in relation to a buy-out agreement in a 
closely held company and, if the company is solvent then a creditor would 
not succeed in an application to injunct the buy-out. However, it is one 
more statutory requirement and expense that must be complied with and 
borne in the context of a purchase of own shares which detracts from the 
simplicity, speed and utility of the procedure without, arguably, providing 
a countervailing protective benefit which outweighs the expense and 
inconvenience of the procedure. 
For the reasons above it is concluded that neither the Close Corporations 
Act 1989 (if it is ever proclaimed to come into force), nor the provisions of 
the Corporations Act 1989 are likely to provide a viable or acceptable 
method to effect a buy-out agreement in a closely held company. 
Redeemable Preference Shares 
Section 120 provides for the issue of preference shares redeemable at the 
option of the company, or otherwise. The redemption of such shares is 
treated in the traditional way with the pre-conditions for redemption being 
that the redemption funds come from either profits otherwise available for 
dividends or out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares made for the 
purpose of the redemption. It will be recalled that under the Companies 
Act 1993 (N .Z.) shares redeemable at the option of the company are 
subject to the solvency test (and, in effect, treated as a repurchase) and 
other redeemable shares are only brought within the "solvency net" and 
treated as distributions for the purpose of recovering amounts paid to 
redeem shares when the solvency test is not satisfied immediately after the 
redemption, and, presumably, only if the company is wound up. 
The issues raised above in relation to potential majority manipulation of 
the Articles, to override or amend the terms of redemption or the 
conditions concerning a fresh issue of shares, and manipulation of the 
company's financial situation to make any profits available for dividend 
distribution magically disappear, apply equally in the Australian context. 
Given the continuity of legislative treatment in Australia in relation to 
redeemable preference shares, it is likely that buy-out agreements in 
closely-held companies will continue to be effected by this mechanism, 
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since the new share repurchase provisions and the (as yet unproclaimed) 
Close Corporations Act do not appear to provide a suitable alternative 
avenue. 
2. GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS 
(a) New Zealand 
The term "going private" refers to a publicly listed company repurchasing a 
sufficient number of its own shares so that it no longer meets the relevant 
Stock Exchange's listing requirements (i.e. shareholding "spread" 
requirements) and, as a consequence of such non-compliance, is delisted 
from the Stock Exchange. Under the old Companies Act 1955, an analogy 
would be with a public company delisting and becoming a private 
company. Of course, under the Companies Act 1993 there is no distinction 
drawn between public and private companies, only between listed and 
unlisted companies. 
Going private transactions are most commonly associated with takeover 
defence strategies, or as a strategy by a powerful insider group to further 
consolidate its control of the company and thus capture for itself future 
gains to be made by the company. Insiders may exploit special 
information to which only they are privy, e.g. knowledge that the 
company's trading prospects are going to improve markedly in the future. 
Clearly, if offeree shareholders are not aware of these prospects because 
the price sensitive information is not public, then they will be prepared to 
accept a price for their shares which does not factor in this inside 
information and is therefore likely to result in an acquisition of their shares 
at an undervalue. Wealth would thus flow from outsider offeree 
shareholders to insider offeror shareholders. 
In North America it has been a common tactic in a going private 
transaction to make a so called two tiered-offer. The first tier of the offer 
is a pro-rata offer to acquire a proportionate number of each shareholder's 
shares. This part of the offer is intended to significantly reduce the number 
of shares outstanding. The second tier of the offer is a selective, or 
targeted, repurchase. In the targeted repurchase perhaps a single or a 
limited number of large shareholders would be made an offer at a premium 
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for their shares, in order to consolidate the control of the offeror insiders. 
When a sufficient level of control has been achieved, the selective offer to 
a single or a few major shareholders may be supplemented, depending on 
the circumstances, with a so-called "bundled offer", whereby a further 
targeted offer, or pro-rata offer, is made to the remaining shareholders to 
acquire all of their shares at the same price. In practice the selective offer 
is more common because once the company is able to delist then any 
remaining minority may be frozen out by a variety of tactics such as a 
staged amalgamation, hiving off all assets to a separate company and 
winding up the original company, or, perhaps, to announce a reduced or no 
dividend policy for future years. Shareholders dependent upon the income 
from their shares will be more willing to sell in these circumstances than if 
a previous dividend rate was maintained. While, theoretically these tactics 
should be capable of being restrained, or compensation paid to affected 
shareholders after the event to compensate them for their loss, due to the 
business judgment rule in North American jurisdictions, and difficulties of 
proof of loss, often shareholders are left with no effective remedy, and no 
choice but to sell out. 
It is worth noting in passing that though New Zealand has no statutory or 
recognised common law business judgment rule, the Courts have been 
extremely reluctant in New Zealand to second-guess management 
decisions, in all but the clearest cases of abuse. Since the means of proof 
of wrong doing is almost invariably confined to the inner sanctum of the 
Board, and perhaps a major shareholder or shareholders acting in collusion, 
it is almost impossible for aggrieved shareholders to succeed on the basis 
of breach of directors' duties either to themselves, qua shareholders, or 
even more particularly in relation to breach of directors' duties to the 
company so as to found a derivative action in the name of the company. 
A management or management/shareholder group which intends to take a 
public company private, either as a defence to a threatened takeover or to 
capture future profits for themselves, has a number of options, through the 
share repurchase mechanism, under the Companies Act 1993. 
The obvious first step would be a pro-rata offer under section 60(l)(a). 
Under section 60(3) the Board may only make such a pro-rata offer if it 
has previously resolved: 
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(1) that the acquisition in question is in the best interests of the 
company; and 
(2) that the terms of the offer and the consideration offered for 
the shares are fair and reasonable to the company; and 
(3) that it is not aware of any information that will not be 
disclosed to shareholders -
(i) which is material to an assessment of the value of the 
shares; and 
(ii) and as a result of which the terms of the offer in 
consideration offered for the shares are unfair to 
shareholders accepting the offer. 
In addition, subsection 4 requires that the directors' resolution must also set 
out in full the reasons for the directors' conclusions. 
By structuring the going private transaction as a pro-rata share repurchase 
the insiders clearly have no intention of taking up the pro-rata offer 
themselves. However, by using the section 60(1)(a) procedure the Board 
does not have to comply with the disclosure requirements which would 
apply if the offer was structured as a special offer under section 60(l)(b) 
and section 61. It is a bizarre result that a going private transaction can be 
effected under the less stringent regime for pro-rata transactions, even 
though, as noted above, the offer will not be taken up proportionately 
because the insiders have no intention of selling their shares. Their interest 
is quite the opposite, being to consolidate their control of the company and 
take it out of the public arena, thus capturing future profits for themselves 
alone, or, in a takeover situation, removing the company from the takeover 
arena. 
The first leg of the trifecta that the Board must resolve is that the 
acquisition is in the best interests of the company. It would be a simple 
matter for the Board to rationalise this ground by stating that with a 
reduced shareholding transaction costs would be reduced to the benefit of 
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the company. By going private the company would no longer have to pay 
listing fees, and with a shrunken shareholder base the servicing costs of 
distributing annual reports and other requisite information to shareholders 
would also be proportionately reduced. Again, it is submitted that the 
Courts, except in the face of very strong evidence to the contrary, would 
not second-guess the Board's apparent commercial assessment. A de facto 
business judgment rule would, in all likelihood, be applied with the Court 
refusing to look behind the Board's resolution. 
The second requirement is that the terms of the off er and the consideration 
offered for the shares are fair and reasonable to the company. Again, this 
should not prove a great hurdle to the Board. In order to fire-proof itself 
the Board would merely need to make an offer at, or at a slight premium 
above, the current prevailing market rate, in order to make the offer of 
reacquisition attractive to offeree shareholders. It is hard to see how an 
aggrieved shareholder would succeed in a claim for injunctive relief, a 
derivative action, or a personal action on the basis that the company was 
disadvantaged by the offer, the consideration for which was at or near the 
prevailing market price. Obviously, the lower the price at which the shares 
could be acquired then the more likely is the acquisition to be in the best 
interests of the company and the price offered is fair and reasonable to the 
company. 
The third matter that must be resolved is that the Board is unaware of any 
price sensitive inside information. Again, this should not prove unduly 
burdensome to a determined Board. Even if the Board was of the view that 
the future profitability of the firm was likely to improve considerably, it 
could argue that this was entirely speculative and with no knowledge of 
existing facts which could affect the market price of the shares in question. 
It would be far more difficult if the Board was aware of large and 
profitable contracts which were to be concluded, or business opportunities 
which were effectively "in the bag". However, it is of the very essence of 
inside information that it is known only to a few parties. It would not be 
difficult for a unscrupulous Board to delay signature of contracts and 
restructure commercial documentation in order to give the impression that 
the deals were less than certain to be concluded at the time of the offer, or 
that there were real outstanding contingencies. 
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It can be argued with some force that the second limb of this third 
requirement should, in theory, prevent a going private transaction 
proceeding where an insider group intends to capture for itself future 
benefits which would otherwise be distributed amongst all shareholders. 
This limb requires that the Board must not be aware of information which 
makes the terms of the off er and the consideration offered for the shares 
unfair to shareholders accepting the offer. In a perfect world a Board 
would not certify to these matters in the circumstances discussed. 
However, the reality is that such abuses have occurred in the past, and will 
continue to occur, and a resolution and certification procedure is unlikely 
to prevent future abuses unless human nature changes dramatically for the 
better. In short, the certification requirements under the section 60(1)(a) 
pro-rata procedure will, in reality, offer no protection at all against an 
unscrupulous insider group determined to capture future benefits for itself. 
If the facts are changed so that the going private transaction is treated as a 
response to a perceived or threatened takeover bid, then the analysis is 
slightly different. Under the first limb of the subsection 3 requirements the 
Board must justify the transaction as being in the best interests of the 
company. Again, it should not be difficult for a determined management 
to find apparently cogent reasons under subsection 4 to fulfil this limb. 
The Board could cite its apprehension that the raider did not intend to add 
value to the continuing business, but rather was an asset stripper whose 
only intention was to get its hands on undervalued assets and break up the 
company, rather than continuing to trade as a going concern. Another 
reason could also be that the Board considers the business philosophy of 
the raider to be incompatible with the existing culture of the company, so 
that an acquisition would be dysfunctional and would not benefit the 
company's ongoing operations. Management could also state that it had a 
number of business strategies and initiatives in place or contemplated that 
would significantly add value to the company, and that these initiatives 
would be put at risk, and may never be implemented, if the takeover took 
place. It would be resolved by the Board that this would diminish the 
value of the company, and the share buyback was therefore necessary to 
preserve these opportunities and the possibility of converting them into 
increased shareholder wealth. 
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It would appear that the only way that a Board could be gain-said by a 
hostile shareholder would be if that shareholder had access to inside 
information which cast a real doubt on the motives of the certifying Board. 
Under the second limb, if the pro-rata offer price was at market price or at 
a slight premium above it is submitted that it would be practically 
impossible to show that the terms of the offer and consideration for the 
shares were not fair and reasonable to the company. It would have to be 
shown that the price offered for the shares was far in excess of the actual 
asset backing of the shares, and also taking into account future business 
opportunities. If the offer is made at or around market price, in order to 
give an incentive to offeree shareholders to sell their shares back to the 
company, it is hard to see how the repurchase transaction could be 
impugned on the basis that the consideration offered was not fair and 
reasonable to the company. 
If a takeover offer is by way of a stand in the market or other public 
mechanism then there will be no problem with the Board certifying the 
third limb, i.e. that it is not aware of inside information. However, if the 
Board gets wind of a creeping acquisition or an otherwise covert attempt to 
gain a foothold platform from which to launch a full bid, then it clearly, in 
good conscience, could not certify under the third limb. Again, the 
practical reality is that it would be extremely difficult to prove that the 
Board did have such knowledge of an attempted covert incremental 
takeover. It is submitted that it would not be enough to show merely that 
the Board had access to detailed information from the Share Register on 
recent acquisitions. Shares can be purchased through nominees, and most 
often are in the case of the initial stages of a takeover where a foothold 
platform is put together. The Board could quite easily appear disingenuous 
and deny that the reason for going private was in response to a perceived 
threat of takeover. Rather, it would be pitching the going private 
transaction as a means of lowering the company's operational expenses by 
deli sting. 
The second method to consider is that available under section 60(1)(b)(i). 
Because of the necessity for unanimous shareholder consent to be 
obtained, a public company with a dispersed and diverse shareholding 
would never be able to satisfy this requirement. 
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The third possibility for effecting a going private transaction would be a 
special offer under section 60(1 )(b )(ii). The ability to make a targeted 
purchase must be contained in the constitution, and the requirements of 
section 61 also apply. 
It will be recalled that under the special off er procedure contained in 
section 61 the Board must, in addition to the resolution required by section 
60(3) (discussed above), also have resolved that: 
(i) the acquisition is of benefit to the remaining shareholders; 
and 
(ii) the terms of the offer and the price is also fair and reasonable 
to the remaining shareholders. 
In a going-private transaction these two requirements will be met, at least 
in respect of the remaining majority insiders, if not the remaining minority 
who will inevitably face the prospect of being frozen out later or facing a 
coerced sale sooner at an unfavourable price. The potential for abuse 
rather runs in the other direction where shares are acquired by insiders at 
an undervalue from offeree shareholders. 
Section 61(8) provides that a shareholder or the company may seek 
injunctive relief on the basis that the above requirements are not met. 
However, it will be clear from the above discussion that given the de facto 
shield of the business judgment rule, it is submitted that it would be very 
rare indeed for injunctive relief to be successful. 
The final hurdle under the special acquisition procedure is the requirement 
under section 61(5) that before an offer is made the company must send to 
each shareholder a disclosure document complying with section 62. 
Section 62 requires disclosure of: 
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(b) the nature and extent of any relevant interest of any director 
of the company; and 
( c) the text of the resolutions required by section 61, together 
with any such further information and explanation as may be 
necessary to enable a reasonable shareholder to understand 
the nature and implications for the company and its 
shareholders of the proposed acquisition. 
The necessity for the disclosure document to provide the text of the section 
61 resolution together with all further information and explanation should, 
in theory, prevent the special offer procedure being used in a situation 
where an inside group is seeking to capture future profits for itself. 
It has been argued that the disclosure document required by section 61(5) 
and section 62 is inadequate to fully and fairly inform shareholders. 
Reference is often made to the extremely detailed requirements of rule 
13(e) of the Securities and Exchange Code in the United States. However, 
an alternative view is that the very breadth of the third limb requirement in 
section 62 would encompass all of the matters covered by rule 13( e) and 
perhaps quite a number of others. After all, the third limb is expressed so 
that what must be achieved by a Board is a fair and balanced picture, 
taking into account all relevant material, to enable a reasonable shareholder 
(whatever that means) to assess whether or not they should take up the 
offer to sell their shares. If properly complied with, this is an extremely 
onerous requirement and would foreclose exploitation of the special 
acquisition procedure for motives such as those posited above. The reality 
would probably be very different. 
On its face, the requirement to send the disclosure document to each 
shareholder would not make the section 61 procedure viable for a major 
listed company with a dispersed shareholding. This would be the case, 
particularly if the going private transaction was in response to a perceived 
threat of takeover, where speed in defence is necessarily of the essence. In 
this regard section 61(6) should be noted. The offer must not be made 
until at least 10 days have elapsed since the section 61(5) disclosure 
document has been sent to all shareholders. 
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Also, and more critically, to be an effective defensive option the special 
offer procedure must be capable of being made on market so that the 
company is able to raise its bid price in response to a raise in its rival's 
offered price. 
If a disclosure document contains a fixed price, as it logically must, in 
relation to an off market special offer, then any time the rival raised its bid 
a fresh offer document would need to be prepared and sent out to all 
shareholders! This would not be administratively possible for most large 
public companies. 
Section 62(a) requires the disclosure document to set out, inter alia, "the 
terms of the offer". If this means a fixed stated price then the on-market 
procedure would not be feasible because all the rival would have to do 
would be to raise its price, requiring the target to send out another 
disclosure document. However, if the price can be stated as falling within 
a fixed range of prices when the offer is to be effected on-market then the 
procedure is feasible because the company can vary the price of its own 
bid to better its rival's offer. 
It is submitted that the better view is that a fixed price must be stated, 
given that the safeguards built into the special offer procedure are designed 
to prevent bail-outs at overvalue by insider shareholders or their associates. 
Given that in a takeover bidding context a premium over market price will 
always be paid, and on-market purchases will be executed by the 
exchange's anonymous order-matching system there does not appear to be 
any possibility of this type of specific bail-out abuse being successful. The 
whole purpose of the special offer repurchase as a takeover defence is to 
achieve acceptances for a sufficiently large number of shares to repel the 
takeover bid from whoever is willing to accept the offer. 
By effectively preventing such special offers being made on-market the 
rules relating to special offers operate in the takeover contest situation to 
prevent shareholders from receiving the maximum premium available. 
The remaining procedure available for a going private transaction would be 
an on market offer under section 63. The analysis under section 63 is 
mcc316 
41 
similar to that undertaken above in relation to section 61, except that what 
requires to be resolved under section 63(1)(b) and (c) is that the acquisition 
is in the best interests of the company and its shareholders and that the 
terms of the offer and the price offered are fair and reasonable to the 
company and its shareholders. In effect, the requirements of section 
60(3)(c)(ii) and section 61(1) are fused where a section 63 on-market offer 
with prior notice to shareholders is involved. 
This picks up the point made above that in a going private transaction there 
is going to be no doubt at all that the transaction will be fair in all respects 
to the remaining (insider) shareholders. However, it is quite another matter 
for a Board to certify that the transaction is in the best interests and fair to 
all shareholders, i.e. remaining and exiting shareholders. This certification 
requirement should preclude a Board from proceeding with an on-market 
selective purchase where the strategy is to garner future profits for a small 
insider group of shareholders, but for the reasons given above will almost 
certainly be an ineffective deterrent to malpractice. 
Section 63(8) provides a similar procedure to that provided in section 
61(8), whereby injunctive relief can be sought by either a shareholder or 
the company. Due to the institutionalised imbalance in information 
available to insiders and outsiders it seems highly unlikely that a 
shareholder will have the requisite knowledge to impugn the resolutions. 
The only real possibility of injunctive relief succeeding would appear to be 
a proceeding brought on behalf of the company by an independent director 
who was aware of what the insider group was intending to achieve. This 
comment applies equally to the analysis under section 61. 
In this regard it is interesting to note in passing the recommendations 
contained in a recent Australian publication entitled Strictly Boardroom5 
which recommended, inter alia, that an "ideal" board for a public listed 
company would comprise the following: 
5 
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(c) audit committee comprising non-executive directors. 
The whole thrust of this publication is the necessity to, wherever possible, 
have a majority of professional independent directors on the Board of 
public companies. If this is in fact achieved, then all of the abuses outlined 
in respect of going private transactions should be curtailed because 
executive directors (management insiders) would not be able to achieve the 
necessary majority to pass the resolutions required to effect abusive 
transactions. The independent external scrutiny of a majority of non-
executive directors should provide a powerful disincentive to an insider 
management group to seek to abuse its position by profiting from its 
insider status. 
Finally, once again before the offer is proceeded with on market, the 
disclosure document must be sent to each shareholder (section 63(6)). The 
same comments about the impracticability of such a requirement for a 
large public company with a dispersed shareholding applies equally in the 
context of a discussion of section 63. 
A further point to note under sections 60, 61 and 63 is the requirement for 
the Board to resolve that the transaction is, inter alia, in the best interests of 
the company. In the context of an offer to repurchase, whether it be a pro-
rata offer, a selective offer, or an offer to all shareholders on market, there 
is an essential ambiguity in the use of the term "company". It seems 
reasonably clear that sometimes the term "company" is intended to mean 
something different than the interests of the shareholders in their entirety. 
This follows from the fact that in section 63 ( on market off er to all 
shareholders subject to notice requirements) the terms "shareholders" and 
"the company" are used cumulatively. It therefore follows that the two 
terms must be intended by the architects of the Act to mean different 
things, but just what that difference is is elusive. 
In the context of a special acquisition, the transaction must be in the best 
interests not only of the company, but also in the best interests of the 
remaining shareholders. So, in this context company can only mean 
something other than the remaining shareholders. Logically, it can only 
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mean the exiting (selling) shareholders and the company entity as a going 
concern. 
In relation to a pro-rata offer no group of shareholders is identified, and 
only the best interests of the company test must be satisfied. Since a pro-
rata offer contemplates that, if the offer is taken up in a true pro-rata 
manner, that the relative ownership participation and thus voting rights will 
remain unchanged, the likely interpretation of the term "company" in this 
context is the company as a going concern or entity. However, this does 
not take us very far logically. The company is merely a juristic entity and 
it does not, it is submitted, take an analysis of the term any further forward 
in any meaningful way. What does the term "company" add to the term 
"all shareholders"? 
These ambiguities aside, it is also important to note that where the term 
"company", or "(all) shareholders" is used in the context of a best interests 
test, it is oversimplistic to regard the interests of all shareholders as being 
identical. Where one is driven by logic to equate the interests of the 
company with the interests of all shareholders (as in the pro-rata offer 
context) then the same caution applies. In a going private transaction, the 
above analysis has demonstrated that the interests of the remaining 
(insider) shareholders will be very different from the interests of exiting 
( outsider) shareholders. The potential in the going private transaction for 
insiders to exploit their special knowledge and control of management 
mechanisms means that it will be in the interests of the remaining (insider) 
shareholders, and thus the company, that the shares of the offeree 
shareholders be acquired at the lowest possible price. This will enrich the 
remaining shareholders because the assets of the company used to acquire 
the departing shareholders' shares will bear a disproportionate relationship 
to the diminution in the overall value of the enterprise. 
Conversely, it is in the interests of exiting shareholders to receive the 
highest price possible for their shares. As they will have no further 
immediate contact with the company as investors, their preference would 
be for a transfer of wealth to themselves at the expense of the company 
and, of necessity, the remaining shareholders. The complexities 
necessarily increase where there are different classes of shares, where class 
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rights are to be altered or where new classes of shares with different rights 
attaching are in contemplation of issue by the Board. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate these issues further, and 
it is sufficient for the writer's purposes to note that in a repurchase 
transaction shareholders cannot be treated as a homogenous group. It is 
their very heterogeneity that provides the impetus for many common (if 
potentially abusive) repurchase transactions. 
Draft Takeovers Code 
A final draft Takeovers Code was released by the Takeovers Panel 
Advisory Committee established under the Takeovers Act 1993 in 
December 1993. 
The draft Code's provisions must also be considered in the context of any 
discussion of going private repurchases intended either as takeover 
defences, or to capture control for insiders in circumstances where there is 
no takeover offer pending. 
Essentially the draft Code provides the fundamental rule in Rule 4 that, 
subject to certain exceptions, a person who holds less than 20% of the 
shares in a listed company cannot increase that shareholding to more than 
20%, and a person who holds 20% or more of such shares cannot further 
increase that shareholding unless the increase is made pursuant to an offer 
made in compliance with the Code. 
An offer under the Code may be either a full offer for all of the shares 
(Rule 6), or a partial offer (Rule 7), but in either case the same terms 
should be offered to all shareholders of the same class (Rule 10) and, in 
respect of a partial offer, the offer must be pro rata. Where the maker of a 
partial off er controls less than 50% of the voting shares then the partial 
offer must be for a sufficient number of shares to give the partial offeror 
more than 50% control, unless a lesser percentage is approved by a 
resolution of the target company in general meeting. 
On its face Rule 4 would catch insiders in going private transactions where 
either as a result of the insider's non take-up of a pro-rata offer of 
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repurchase, or a successful selective repurchase or repurchases, that 
insider's shareholding goes beyond the 20% threshold. For example, an 
insider director holding 20% of the company's shares could cause the 
company either by a pro-rata or selective offer alone, or by a combination 
of the two methods, to acquire half of the company's outstanding shares. If 
there were 1,000 shares before the repurchase programme, with the insider 
director holding 200 of them, the company's acquisition of half the balance 
( 400) would leave a total of 600 shares. The insider director's percentage 
holding would have increased from 20% to 33.3%, and Rule 4 would 
require him or her to make either a full or partial offer. If a partial offer is 
chosen, then because less than 50% of the voting rights are held, the partial 
offer must take the offeror over the 50% threshold. 
The Code's application to going private transactions is reinforced by the 
commentary to an earlier draft of the Code which confirmed the drafters' 
intention that Rule 4 may be breached by "involuntary", or indirect, 
increases resulting from repurchases. This raises the issue of whether 
going private transactions motivated by either of the reasons posited above 
will be possible unless the insiders are prepared to fund a partial off er for 
the balance of shares necessary to take them to over a 50% holding from 
their own resources ( or from the company's resources using the financial 
assistance provisions) or make a full offer, and if 100% acceptance is 
achieved ( or at least 90% to trigger the compulsory acquisition provisions 
of Rule 4.8 of the NZSE Listing Rules), use the section 107 unanimous 
agreement procedure to concur, after the event, to the provision of 
financial assistance otherwise than in accordance with sections 76 to 80 
(section 107(1)(e)). 
NZSE Listing Requirements 
In the example given above in relation to the draft Takeovers Code, issues 
would also arise under the new NZSE Listing Requirements. 
Essentially, the new stock exchange rules provide for compulsory "Notice 
and Pause" requirements (Rule 4.5) in relation to "restricted transfers" of 
shares. A restricted transfer is one which would result in control of votes 
by any person, or group of persons who are associated persons, exceeding 
20% of the votes for any particular class of shares, or, if a holding is above 
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the 20% threshold, would result in an increase of more than 5% in any 12 
month period. 
The notice and pause requirements are intended to provide a period before 
which any restricted transfer becomes legally binding. The notice to the 
Exchange must include, inter alia, the price or consideration ( expressed as 
a range if it is not fixed), any conditions which may be material to an 
assessment of price by prospective sellers, the maximum number of shares 
and percentage to which the transfer proposal relates, the identity of likely 
transferees and the number and percentage of shares likely to be held by 
them. 
There is a 15 business day pause period if the prospective transferees are 
insiders, and a 3 business day pause period if they are not. 
These notice and pause requirements are clearly designed to give other 
prospective bidders an opportunity to mount rival bids which are superior 
to the original bid. In this way it is hoped that a takeover bidding contest 
will develop such that shareholders in the target company ultimately 
receive the best price for their shares if they decide to accept an offer. 
In relation to the going private transaction discussed under the draft 
Takeovers Code, the notice and pause provisions would clearly apply, to 
give other rival bidders an opportunity to up the ante. The consequence for 
an insider management group is that these provisions will prevent it 
acquiring control for a price less than a rival bidder may be prepared to 
pay. Essentially, the repurchase transactions which would increase the 
insider's shareholding beyond the 20% threshold are automatically 
subjected to the notice and pause provisions and can be negated by a 
higher offer. 
The going private bid may still succeed, but the price the company must 
pay to go private may have to be significantly increased to top rival bids. 
Consequently the notice and pause provisions should have the desirable 
effect of ensuring that exiting shareholders, through any ensuing bidding 
contest, receive the best possible price for their shares at that time. 
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(b) Australia 
In the context of a going private transaction the provisions in relation to 
public listed companies need to be considered. Though the provisions of 
the Corporations Act 1989 relating to share buy-backs do not contain the 
specific resolution and certification provisions contained in the Companies 
Act 1993 (NZ), i.e. in relation to the transaction being in the best interests 
of the company and/or the company and its shareholders, and/or the 
company and the remaining shareholders, directors in Australia are under 
the same common law fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the 
company as apply in most Commonwealth jurisdictions. For this reason 
the commentary contained in this paper in relation to the New Zealand 
provisions is also applicable in the Australian context, and will not be 
repeated here. Rather, the daunting mechanics involved in the various 
share repurchase options for public companies will be considered, as they 
impact on the viability of each method of proposed buy-back. 
A critical limitation to a going private transaction, whether the going 
private transaction is to be effected by a buy-back scheme, an on-market 
purchase programme, or a selective buy-back, or any combination of these 
methods is that section 133EA provides an absolute limit on the number of 
shares that can be purchased in any 12 month period. That limit is 10% of 
the outstanding shareholding. In these circumstances, it is submitted that a 
going private transaction often could not be effected within a viable time 
period to achieve the objectives identified above in relation to such a 
transaction where going private is intended as a vehicle for insiders to gain 
control out of the company's assets and secure future benefits exclusively 
for themselves. In relation to an attempt to go private as a takeover 
defence, the 10% limit will defeat this strategy in most cases, thus 
depriving shareholders of the opportunity to receive a higher price from the 
company than from the takeover off eror. In this respect the New Zealand 
provisions are more flexible than the Australian provisions. 
If enough shares can be purchased by the company it may no longer meet 
the Stock Exchange's listing requirements. ASX rules 1A(3), and 3J(9) 
prescribe the spread requirements for shares to retain their listing status. 
ASX rule 1A(3)(b) provides that a company seeking a Official Quotation 
of shares may be considered for admission to the Official List (and by 
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implication remain listed) if, inter alia, there are at least 500 shareholders, 
each with a parcel of shares having a value of at least $2,000. 
The closer to the minimum spread requirements a company is then the 
easier it will be to effect a going private transaction within the 10% 
acquisition ceiling. Many companies however will exceed the spread 
requirements by such a margin that the 10% in 12 months limit would 
prevent anything but a slowly "creeping" inside takeover. 
In relation to an off-market buy-back scheme (which in effect is a 
proportional offer to all shareholders like a Part A takeover offer) then, 
pursuant to section 133GA, the offers under the buy-back scheme can only 
be made after an ordinary resolution of the company has been passed, if the 
Board is aware that there is a takeover offer pending. 
In addition, the notice of resolution required to be sent out to all 
shareholders entitled to vote on the resolution to make offers under the 
buy-back scheme must set out the "takeover" aspects of the proposed 
resolution (inter alia) (section 106GD(4)). 
"Takeover aspects" is defined in section 133BF. Subsection 1 of that 
section provides that a notice that sets out the intention to propose a 
resolution of a company sets out the takeover aspects of the proposed 
resolution if, and only if, the notice complies with the section. The notice 
must set out whether or not any of the company's directors is aware of: 
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(a) a proposal by a person: 
(i) to acquire, or to increase the extent of, a substantial 
interest in the company; or 
(ii) without limiting the generality of sub-paragraph 1, to 
make a takeover bid in relation to the shares of the 
company; or 
(b) a takeover bid that has been made by a person in relation to 
shares in the company and offers under which remain open 
as at that time. 
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Under section 133F(3), if any of the directors is aware of any such 
takeover activity the notice must set out whether or not such a proposal or 
takeover bid has influenced the decision to propose the resolution, and, if it 
has, particulars of each proposal and takeover bid concerned, and the 
extent to which each has influenced that decision. 
The purpose of this notification requirement is to make shareholders aware 
that a third party is interested in acquiring shares in the company. Against 
this background of competition for their shares, shareholders will view any 
offer for their shares by the company very differently than if they were 
unaware of an alternative offer. The rule is designed to assist willing 
sellers to achieve the best sale price for their shares. 
It is submitted that since a going private transaction is in effect a method of 
internal takeover by a management or management/shareholder aligned 
insider group, then there would be a necessity for takeover aspects to be 
included in the notice of resolution sent out to all shareholders entitled to 
vote. This situation seem to fall squarely within the words of the second 
limb of section 133BF(l)(a)(i), at least in circumstances where a 
substantial interest was held by any insider and the purpose and effect of 
the going private transaction necessarily would be to increase the extent of 
that substantial interest as a result of repurchased shares being cancelled 
and thus increasing the insiders' proportionate stake in (and control over) 
the company. If this was complied with to the letter by the insider/insider 
management aligned group, then, in the absence of reasons or 
rationalisations that were persuasive to shareholders that the price offered 
to them was fair, then it is unlikely that a sufficient majority of votes could 
be solicited to pass the necessary resolution. 
Section 133GD(9) also requires the directors to set out in the notice all 
other information that is known to any of the directors and may reasonably 
be expected to influence a person in deciding whether or not to vote in 
favour of the resolution. As has been seen above, a similar provision is 
contained in the New Zealand provisions, and if complied with should 
prevent the passage of the resolution unless the reasons given are sufficient 
to persuade offeree shareholders that it is in their best interests and the best 
interests of the company that the transaction proceed. 
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In relation to a selective buy-back, a special 75/75 super majority must 
vote in favour of the selective buy-back (section 133JA). Once again, a 
notice must be sent to all shareholders entitled to vote on the resolution 
that the selective buy-back proceed, and the notice must contain the 
reasons the buy-back is being proposed and the facts and principles 
underlying those reasons (section 133KB), and also the takeover aspects of 
the proposed resolution (section 133KH(ii)). In addition section 133KJ 
requires the notice to set out what the directors consider will be the likely 
effect on the company's state of affairs if the proposed buy-back is made, 
and a declaration of solvency must also be contained in the notice. An 
expert's report that the offer is fair and reasonable must also be provided by 
an independent expert, and, if there is an element of non-cash 
consideration included, the opinion of two independent experts is required 
that that non-cash consideration portion of the offer is also fair and 
reasonable. Clearly these expert certification requirements will add 
significantly to the time and expense required to progress any affected 
repurchase transaction. 
Additionally, section 133KK requires that the notice must set out, in 
relation to each of the directors, any associated person of that director, and 
also a director's disclosure of interest. The notice must also set out what 
the directors will consider will be the likely effect on the control of the 
company if the proposed buy-back is made, and also in relation to each of 
the directors whether they consider that if the proposed buy-back were 
made, and the shares were cancelled immediately afterwards, the director 
would be entitled to more than 20% of the shares in the company, and if 
so, the respective percentages to which the directors consider it likely that 
they would be entitled (section 133K.L). The impact of these disclosure 
requirements on a proposed going private transaction are obvious. They 
have been designed to ensure that there is transparency in relation to 
directors' motives and the effect that a selective repurchase would have in 
relation to any increase in directors' control of the company if the buy-back 
was to proceed. 
Finally, section 133KM requires the notice to set out all other information 
that is known to any of the directors which may reasonably be expected to 
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influence a person in deciding whether or not to vote in favour of the 
resolution. 
These comprehensive requirements, which are designed to provide to 
shareholders entitled to vote the full picture of the motivations and likely 
effect on the purchase, should, if complied with, prevent an abusive going 
private transaction proceeding. If the reasons for a bona fide going private 
transaction (as discussed above in the New Zealand section) are in fact 
present, then the extensive notice requirements should not prevent such a 
going private transaction proceeding. 
However, in relation to a hostile takeover bid, and the proposed use of the 
buy-back procedure to mount a defence, the periods of notice required will 
usually prevent the company acting quickly enough to mount an effective 
defence, and the 10% repurchase limit will firmly nail the coffin lid down. 
Once again a creditor's objection procedure, similar to that applying to a 
buy-back scheme, applies in the case of a selective buy-back, with the 
consequences discussed. 
It is submitted that in certain circumstances the going private transaction is 
viable under the Australian provisions. The procedural safeguards are 
complex, lengthy and cumbersome. But, if there is no particular 
requirement for haste, and great care is taken, these requirements can be 
complied with. However, in the very situation, such as a hostile takeover 
offer which the directors honestly and reasonably believe not to be in the 
best interests of the company, the delays in relation to the selective buy-
back procedure created by the notice requirements, the necessity for the 
75/75 special resolution, and the 10% repurchase limit will frustrate a 
takeover defence based on the selective special offer procedure, and thus 
deprive shareholders in the target company of the opportunity to receive a 
higher price for their shares than offered by the raider. It is ironic that a 
legitimate use of the special offer procedure to take a company private in 
order to protect the best interests of the shareholders cannot be effected 
under this procedure. 
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3. CAPITAL MARKET ARBITRAGE TRANSACTIONS 
(a) New Zealand 
The ability for a company to repurchase its own shares on a regular basis 
on market provides a method by which the company can make regular or 
periodic adjustments to its funding/gearing ratios (debt/debt plus equity 
ratio). In order to minimise the cost of capital, a rational company will 
seek to have a higher proportion of its funding through debt securities 
rather than equity securities when the interest payable on the debt in net 
terms is less than the cost of maintaining the equity capital in terms of 
dividend payments and shareholder servicing requirements. 
Clearly, this is a very wide generalisation, because in some circumstances 
the maintenance of a company's share price will depend upon that 
company's dividend payout policy. Rather than risk a loss of market 
confidence in the company's shares by announcing a no-dividend or a 
reduced dividend policy, a viable alternative for a company may be to 
reacquire a proportion of its shares on market and thus reduce the number 
of outstanding shares in respect of which a dividend must be paid. If debt 
is relatively cheap, then funds may be borrowed to fund the acquisition of 
the shares, and the consequent reduction of equity capital. 
This type of ongoing gearing adjustment system can be regarded as a 
normal part of good and prudent company management. However, such a 
regular programme of on market purchases can also be used to maintain 
the share price by keeping the market in that company's shares active and 
thus giving an illusion that the shares are in more demand than they 
actually are. By making significant and regular purchases of its own 
shares, a company can give a buy signal to the market. The market may 
then price the shares at a premium to what could be regarded as the "true" 
value that those shares should command. This so called "ramping" of 
share prices by the artificial expedient of self purchase is generally 
regarded as an abuse of the share repurchase mechanism. 
Because the mechanism to achieve both legitimate gearing requirements 
and share price maintenance is the same, it will be essential for a Board 
engaged in legitimate gearing adjustments to have a clear financial plan 
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which can be audited externally in order to deflect any accusation of share 
price maintenance simpliciter. This is particularly necessary since no "safe 
harbour" provision (such as Rule lOb-18 under the Securities Exchange 
Act 1934 (U.S.A.), which guarantees immunity from allegations of share 
price fixing if purchases are limited as to method of acquisition, timing, 
price and volume) has been included in the Companies Act 1993. 
It is clear that the resolution and disclosure requirements contained in 
section 63 are intended as safeguards to prevent abuse of on-market 
purchases to manipulate share prices or to create an impression of trading 
activity in the shares. However, as will be seen below these requirements 
will undoubtedly have the effect of preventing companies from engaging in 
legitimate programmes of ongoing gearing adjustment by on-market 
purchases. 
Quite simply, the repurchase provisions in the Companies Act 1993 are not 
designed to cope with issuer intervention on a regular basis. Any such 
attempted intervention in the market under section 60(1)(a) appears to 
require management to make an offer to all shareholders every time it 
intends to intervene in the market. Similarly, intervening under section 
60( 1 )(b )(ii) would require the sending of a disclosure document to all 
shareholders (section 61(5) and section 62), and also there is a ten day 
moratorium imposed before any repurchase can be made (section 61(6)). 
Both of these requirements make regular on-market interventions 
completely impractical. 
In the absence of any intention to manipulate share prices, such regular 
interventions for legitimate gearing and adjustment purposes are frustrated 
by formalities and constraints which address abuses that are absent from 
this particular type of transaction. 
In short, the pro-rata offer procedure and the special offer procedure under 
section 61 have been designed in part to include protections against share 
price manipulation. However, in order to prevent this type of abuse, the 
protective mechanism adopted in the legislation is designed so that it also 
prevents legitimate exercises of the power. It could be said that the cure is 
so drastic that it has killed the patient. 
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To recap, the 1993 Act contemplates four principal kinds of offer by a 
company to purchase its own shares: 
(1) a pro-rata offer to all shareholders; 
(2) a selective offer directed to some shareholders; 
(3) an on-market purchase of shares with prior notice to 
shareholders; and 
(4) an on-market purchase of shares without prior notice to 
shareholders 
(sections 59(2), 60, 61, 63, 65). 
Each of these permitted methods of acquisition involves the company 
making an offer to buy shares after satisfying certain formal requirements. 
It does not appear that an ongoing gearing adjustment programme of 
repurchase can be effected through the pro-rata offer procedure. Since this 
type of programme will only be undertaken by large listed companies, the 
only way to implement such a programme would be through a sharebroker 
or brokers. Brokers operate by pooling buy and sell orders and matching 
these orders to effect sale and purchase transactions. In these 
circumstances it is impossible in any given transaction to say who the 
seller is, because the acquired shares come from a homogenous pool. So, 
the requirement under section 60(1)(a) that the offer is "an offer to all 
shareholders to acquire a proportion of their shares" could not be complied 
with. 
Even if the company undertook an extensive advertising campaign in an 
attempt to notify all of its dispersed shareholding that the company was 
making such a pro-rata offer, because of the way that brokers pool buy and 
sell shares described above, there is no way for an instructed broker or 
brokers to ensure that acceptances of the off er to purchase are implemented 
in a pro-rata manner, so that only the required portion of shares is 
purchased from each shareholder, and also where less than the ceiling 
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percentage of shares is tendered for sale by a shareholder that any shortfall 
is rateably distributed amongst other willing sellers. 
Aside from these problems, an on-going capital arbitrage programme may 
require daily, relatively small, interventions: a strategy for which the pro-
rata offer procedure, with its necessity to send an offer document to each 
shareholder and the requirement for a sufficient delay to afford a 
reasonable opportunity to accept the offer (section 60(1)(a)(ii)) is uniquely 
unsuitable. 
The second possible method of implementing such a gearing adjustment 
programme is through the special off er procedure. The problems created 
by the broker's pooling method described above would not apply in the 
case of a special offer under section 60(1 )(b )(ii) because sales and 
purchases from a pool could be described as "an offer to one or more 
shareholders". However, section 61(5) requires that a disclosure document 
be sent to each shareholder before the offer can be made and a minimum 
10 day "fallow period" applies from the day the disclosure document is 
sent. This is a cumbersome and expensive procedure. There does not 
appear to be any advantage in utilising the special offer procedure, in 
preference to the on-market purchase with notice procedure set out in 
section 63. 
The two most obvious methods to effect an ongoing gearing adjustment 
programme are those contained in sections 63 and 65. 
Section 63 provides that the Board may make offers on a stock exchange to 
all shareholders to acquire shares. The Board must first resolve pursuant to 
section 63(1) (and effectively the same, under section 65(1), except that the 
Board certifies as to compliance with the 5% in 12 months ceiling, rather 
than as to acquisition of no more than a specified number of shares): 
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(2) that the acquisition is in the best interests of the company and 
its shareholders; and 
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(3) that the terms of the off er and the consideration offered for 
the shares are fair and reasonable to the company and its 
shareholders; and 
( 4) that it does not have any inside information. 
Where the purpose of repurchase is on-going gearing adjustment a Board 
should be able to certify as to these matters, without too much difficulty, 
though caution will always have to be exercised in respect of the resolution 
as to the absence of inside information. 
Sections 63 and 65 also require resolution and certification as to solvency. 
Any offer must be withdrawn if the number of shares to be acquired 
(together with any shares already acquired by the company) would exceed 
the maximum number of shares the Board has resolved to acquire (section 
63(4)). 
Under subsection 5 the Board must withdraw the offer if after the passing 
of the resolution under subsection 1 and before making the offer it ceases 
to be satisfied that the acquisition is in the best interests of the company 
and its shareholders, or it ceases to be satisfied that the terms of the offer 
and consideration are fair and reasonable to the company and its 
shareholders, or it becomes aware of inside information. 
Subsection 6 requires that a disclosure document, in similar terms to that 
contained under the special offer procedure in section 61, be sent to each 
shareholder before the offer is made. The offer can remain open 12 
months after the disclosure document is sent to each shareholder (section 
63(8)). 
It is interesting to note that in terms of section 64(2), the consideration the 
Board proposes to offer to acquire the shares does not have to be included 
in the disclosure document. On first reflection this seems quite a bizarre 
omission, as price is the most important piece of information that a 
prospective selling shareholder would want to know. The rationale for the 
inclusion of this provision may be that there was concern that if a company 
was required to disclose its uppermost price, or a range of prices, then 
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prospective sellers would be aware of the upper limit that the company was 
prepared to pay, and therefore the price would naturally gravitate up to that 
level. This would inevitably result in the company paying more for the 
shares than it would have to if the normal supply and demand rules that 
operate on the market prevailed. The writer can think of no other reason 
than this for the provision. 
It is submitted that a Board could not, in good faith, certify that the offer 
was in the best interests of the company and shareholders if it also had to 
show its hand by disclosing the top price that it was prepared to pay. It 
cannot be in the best interests of a company to signal in advance to its 
shareholders the range within which it will make offers, or the price 
ceiling, because the market is likely to move to the top of that range, and 
the company (in effect the remaining shareholders) will pay more for the 
shares purchased than would otherwise be the case. 
Acquisitions under section 63 are not subject to an annual limitation such 
as the 5% ceiling in any 12 month period which applies under the section 
65 procedure. Shareholders do not have to be notified in respect of each 
individual transaction, with the disclosure document only having to be sent 
once, and remaining valid for a period from ten days after the offer is made 
out to 12 months as the window within which the transactions can be 
effected. 
A major problem with an onmarket acquisition under section 63 is the fact 
that section 64(1)(c) requires the nature and extent of any relevant interest 
of any director of the company in any shares that may be acquired to be 
stated in the disclosure document sent to all shareholders. While it will be 
possible for directors to provide this information at the time of the offer, 
circumstances will almost certainly change over the intervening 12 month 
period so that the facts stated under limb ( c) of the disclosure document are 
no longer true. Such changes in relevant interests could occur, most 
simply by a sale or purchase of shares by a director, or, by falling foul of 
the related-party transaction requirements, so that if a company in which a 
director held a 20% stake acquired shares or sold shares in the company, 
then necessarily the director's relevant interest would also change. 
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Though it is not stated anywhere explicitly in section 63, a reading of the 
section which seems to best give effect to the policy behind the repurchase 
provisions would be that the disclosure document should always be 
accurate and up to date in order to fully inform shareholders. If this is a 
correct interpretation of the section, then in terms of sub-section 6, before 
any further offer is made the company should send to each shareholder a 
disclosure document that complies with section 64. Any change in 
circumstances would render a previously sent out disclosure document 
inaccurate and, ipso facto, would not comply with section 64 because it 
would be inaccurate. In these circumstances a sensible interpretation is 
that no further offers could be made under the repurchase programme until 
a further amended disclosure document had been again sent to all 
shareholders, which reflected the current and accurate interests of 
directors. 
The company would then have to wait a further ten days after the updated 
and amended disclosure document had been sent to shareholders before it 
could make another on-market purchase. Given the sanctions that can be 
visited on directors under the Act for a breach of any of the requirements, 
it would be a very brave director indeed who would agree to regular on-
market purchase programme, unless he or she, was, at any point in time, 
able to establish with perfect accuracy his or her shareholding, or the 
shareholding of any related party. In many cases, and the problem is 
exacerbated with larger boards, this will be neither practical nor possible. 
The final possible method of implementing an ongoing gearing adjustment 
programme is under the provisions of section 65. Section 65 provides for 
stock exchange acquisitions which are not subject to a prior notice to 
shareholders requirement. However, the main drawbacks with the section 
65 procedure are that the amount that can be purchased in any 12 month 
period is not to exceed 5% of shares in the same class as those being 
acquired as at the date 12 months before the acquisition of the shares. In 
many cases the 5% ceiling will be too low to sit with a fairly regular series 
of purchases, and would not be used for this reason. 
A further problem under section 65, as originally enacted, before it was 
amended by the Companies Act 1993 Amendment Act (No. 1) (assented to 
27 June 1994, to have effect from 1 July 1994) was that sub-section (2) 
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required a disclosure document to be sent to each shareholder within 10 
working days after shares were acquired under the section. 
The ten day disclosure requirement would have been extremely expensive 
and impractical, particularly where regular market interventions are the 
norm, and where transactions are perhaps concluded on a daily basis. For 
large publicly listed companies such as Telecom, Fletcher Challenge and 
Brierly it would simply not be administratively possible to conduct an 
ongoing market purchase programme under these conditions. 
The Amendment Act ameliorates this problem by requiring that notice of 
any purchase must be given to each stock exchange on which the shares 
are listed within 10 working days of each on-market acquisition and all 
shareholders must be notified within three months of each acquisition of 
the matters specified in section 65(2). So, the necessity to notify all 
shareholders of each acquisition is enlarged from a ten day time period to 
three months. This should enable a number of regular purchases to be 
notified in the same notice. While this ameliorates the problem with the 
original section 65(2) it clearly still involves an arguably unnecessary 
significant additional transaction cost. It is suggested that the requirement 
to notify the stock exchange is all that is required and the requirement to 
notify all shareholders ( even quarterly) is unnecessary and should be 
dispensed with. 
As originally enacted, section 65(2)(d) also (if ambiguously) required 
(inter alia) the identity of the seller of shares to the company, to be stated. 
By virtue of the market's order-matching system this was impossible. This 
defect has now been cured by the Amendment Act by rewriting section 
65(2)(d) to make it clear that the identity of the seller only needs to be 
notified to the stock exchange and shareholders if it is known to the 
company. 
From the above discussion it follows that the two methods of on-market 
acquisition which are available to effect an ongoing gearing adjustment, or 
price stabilisation programme, are practically inadequate. The delays and 
expense involved in complying with the various procedures means that 
they would rarely, if ever, be resorted to. 
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One identified abuse of share repurchase is the ability of directors to cause 
the company to buy out their own interests or those of their confedetrates 
at an inflated price. This has the effect of transferring wealth from the 
company to the exiting sellers. Another potential abuse is the purchase of 
those interests at a fair price, but in circumstances where there are few 
buyers for the company shares, so that those who wish to exit from the 
company may be denied the opportunity to do so. Both of these abuses are 
far less likely to occur where purchases are made on-market by a listed 
company. 
In particular, if the offer is made on the New Zealand Stock Exchange, the 
directors cannot control to whom the offer is made, and the company's 
offer to buy can be accepted by any shareholder willing to sell at that price. 
The company is unable to orchestrate who the originator of a sell order it 
accepts might be. 
Given these circumstances, and the fact that boards of public companies 
are very much open to public scrutiny, and rely on their reputations in 
business for (inter alia) their income from future directorships, it would 
appear that a streamlined on-market purchase procedure could be devised 
which provides adequate protection to the company and shareholders. 
It is submitted that an appropriate balance between the practical logistics of 
on-market buy backs and the need to keep shareholders informed of the 
company's presence in the market could be achieved by a modified notice 
requirement under which a company whose board had approved on-market 
buy backs would (in addition to the resolution requirements of sections 
63(1) and 65(1)): 
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(1) give notice of that approval to shareholders no less than ten 
working days and no more than twelve months before 
effecting purchases; and 
(2) would include in the notice the maximum number of shares 
to be acquired and the period during which their acquisition 
had been authorised. 
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This would inform shareholders that the company was in the market to 
acquire their shares. This notice protection is also bolstered by the 
prohibitions on trading by insiders in the Securities Amendment Act 1988, 
which should prevent directors, employees and those who obtain 
information from them from abusing the knowledge by selling their own 
shares, if no announcement has been made. 
(b) New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
The above analysis of transactions under the Act provisions must be read 
in the context of the NZSE Listing rules. The new rules came into effect 
on 1 September 1994. Section 7 of the Rules deals with issues and buy-
backs of securities. 
Rule 7 .6 of the NZSE Rules stipulates certain requirements in respect of 
buy-backs of equity securities and financial assistance. Rule 7 .6.1 
provides that an Issuer shall not acquire its own shares unless the 
acquisition (inter alia): 
(a) is effected by offers made by the Issuer through the 
Exchange's order matching market or through the order 
matching market of a recognised Stock Exchange, and the 
Issuer complies with the prior notice of acquisition 
requirements contained in Rule 7 .6.2; or 
(b) is effected in compliance with section 60( 1 )( a) (read together 
with section 60(2)) of the Companies Act 1993. and the 
Issuer complies with the Rule 7 .6.2 notice requirements. 
What the rule appears to say is that a special offer can only be made on the 
Exchange through the Exchange's order matching (pooling) system, and a 
pro-rata offer must comply with the Companies Act 1993 requirements and 
also the notice procedure set out in Rule 7 .6.2. 
The apparent purpose of requiring that special offers by listed companies 
can only be effected on-market through the stock exchange's order 
matching system is to protect against the particular abuses noted 
immediately above, i.e. insider sale at overvalue to exit a troubled 
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company or to make a windfall gain, or to provide a method of guaranteed 
exit from a company for insiders or their associates in circumstances where 
there were few, or no, potential purchasers for the shares other than the 
company. The essential anonymity of the order-matching system would 
prevent such abuses occurring. 
Rule 7 .6.2 requires that before an issuer acquires its own shares pursuant to 
Rule 7 .6.1 ( a), it must give a notice that: 
(i) specifies a period of time within which the issuer will acquire 
the shares; and 
(ii) specifies the class and maximum number of shares to be 
acquired or sold in that period; and 
(iii) specifies the maximum price at which the shares may be 
acquired by the issuer. 
The effect of Rule 7 .6.1 is that special offers by publicly listed companies 
can only be made on-market, and subject to the notice requirements 
contained in Rule 7 .6.2. As noted in this paper in relation to a discussion 
of section 64(2), the necessity to specify a maximum price which the 
shares may be acquired (Rule 7 .6.2(b )(iii)) will militate against special 
offers made on-market for the reason that the company is signalling in 
advance the maximum price it is prepared to pay, and, in the normal course 
of events, the market price is likely to gravitate to this limit. This makes 
such an on-market purchase option unattractive, and it is submitted that the 
requirement in Rule 7.6.2(b)(iii) to disclose the maximum price could be 
deleted with no loss of protection for shareholders. 
Rule 7.6.l(b) also requires pro-rata offers to be preceded by the notice 
required by Rule 7 .6.2. However, that rule is expressed to be limited to 
acquisitions under Rule 7.6.l(a). On its face, these two provisions are 
inconsistent. Also, the requirement to specify the maximum price at which 
the shares may be acquired by the issuer does not sit easily with a pro-rata 
offer procedure where the exact price will be stated. 
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In addition, Rule 7 .12.1 requires an issuer which buys its own shares to 
immediately give notice to the Exchange of details of the acquisition, 
including the class and number of shares acquired, their nominal value (if 
any) and the acquisition price, whether the payment was in cash, any 
amount paid up (if not in full), the percentage of the total class of share 
acquired, the reason for the acquisition, the specific authority for the 
acquisition (if any), any terms or details of the acquisition, and the total 
number of shares of that particular class still in existence after the 
acquisition. 
The notice requirements of Rule 7 .12.1 will provide considerable 
administrative problems where a large number of transactions are 
conducted by the company, whether on-market or off-market. The rule is 
phrased so that its ordinary meaning appears to be that such notice must be 
complied with each time there is an acquisition. In the case of regular 
purchases it will not be practical for a company to comply with such a 
post-acquisition notification requirement. 
(c) Australia 
The first point to note is that under section 133EA the absolute prohibition 
on a public company acquiring more than 10% of its outstanding shares in 
any 12 month period applies unless the buy-back is an employee-shares 
purchase or an odd lot purchase. In many instances a 10% limit may not 
be sufficient to run an effective ongoing gearing/capital costs arbitrage 
programme. Unlike in the case of proprietary companies under the 
Australian legislation, there is no provision in any circumstances for this 
absolute limited to be exceeded. This could be a major drawback for a 
public company seeking to set up such an ongoing on-market programme. 
The problems identified with buy-back schemes and special offers, which 
are noted above, apply equally in the context of a continuing on-market 
purchase programme. Additionally, it should be noted in relation to a buy-
back scheme (pro-rata offer to all shareholders) that section 133FB(7) 
requires that each such offer must specify the consideration that under the 
offer is to be provided for the buy-back of each share to which the offer 
relates. Where regular purchases are proposed to be made on-market, this 
requirement will never be able to be complied with because the share price 
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will fluctuate and it is therefore impossible to specify the price in advance. 
The price at which the company will be prepared to purchase its own 
shares on-market will vary from time to time depending on market 
conditions and its financial requirements. Theoretically, a ceiling price 
could be specified, but this price would not meet the requirements of the 
section because it is not the price which the company is offering in all 
cases, merely an upper limit. 
Section 133FB(l 1) also requires each offer to relate to a proportion of the 
shares in the company that the offeree holds and that proportion must be 
the same in respect of each offer. In Australia a pooling system similar to 
that operating in New Zealand operates in respect of on-market purchases, 
so, for the reasons given above, this requirement also cannot be met in 
relation to pro-rata offer on the ASX. 
In practice, the pro-rata offer procedure would never be considered for 
such an on-going capital cost arbitrage programme because the essence of 
such a programme is that shares will be purchased from time to time at 
different prices from different shareholders, depending on the company's 
needs at the time. 
It follows that any attempted ongoing on-market purchase programme will 
be conducted under the special offer procedure. In addition to the 
requirements identified in the previous section of this paper, the Australian 
Stock Exchange Listing Rules also provide specific requirements for on-
market buy-backs. The applicable rule is Rule 3V. In essence, Rule 3V 
requires that a company proposing to establish an on-market buy-back 
scheme shall lodge a notice with its Home Exchange which provides the 
following information: 
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(a) that it is the company's intention to purchase its shares on-
market pursuant to the provisions of the Listing Rules and 
that it has attended to all necessary requirements of the 
Corporations Law for this purpose; 
(b) the number and description of the shares of the class on issue 
at the date of the statement, the maximum number of those 
shares the company would wish to acquire and the 
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percentage that the maximum number of those shares bears 
to the number of shares of the class on issue; 
(c) the reasons the company wishes to purchase its shares; 
( d) whether the company is the subject of a takeover offer or 
announcement, or whether any of the directors are aware that 
a takeover off er or announcement will be made for any of the 
securities of the company; 
( e) whether any of the directors and/or their associates wish to 
reserve the right to sell shares on-market to the company and, 
the names of any such directors; 
(f) the name of the Member Organisation (sharebroker) that the 
company will appoint to act on its behalf; 
(g) that there is no information that would be required to be 
disclosed pursuant to the Listing Rules to the market that has 
not already been disclosed; and 
(h) all other information of relevance to shareholders concerning 
the establishment or conduct of the on-market buy-back 
scheme. 
Rule 3V(7)(b) prohibits the company from purchasing any of its shares at a 
price which is 5% higher than the average of the last sale price recorded on 
the Exchange on each of the last five days on which sales in the securities 
were recorded. This condition which is obviously intended to try to 
prevent shares being acquired from directors or their associates or other 
favoured persons at an overvalue, places an unnecessary restraint on the 
company's flexibility to purchase its own shares at the time and price that it 
deems prudent. 
Under Rule3V(8)(c) and (d), it appears that the maximum time period that 
such an ongoing programme can run for is six months, before a fresh 
notice must be filed. Paragraph ( c) puts a time limit of one month on each 
such buying programme, and also provides that the programme can be 
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extended with the extent of the exchange for a further period or periods of 
one month. However, paragraph ( d) provides that the maximum period for 
which the programme can run with extensions is the initial period of one 
month plus five monthly extensions, giving a total of six months. Once 
again this requirement does not sit easily with a proposed ongoing on-
market repurchase programme. 
Rule 3V(9) requires that where the directors or the company are aware of 
an actual or proposed takeover offer or announcement, the company may 
not establish an on-market buy-back scheme unless the company, in 
general meeting by ordinary resolution, approves the establishment of the 
scheme, and where the notice of meeting also includes all of the 
information to be included in the notice to establish an on-market buy-back 
scheme required by Rule 3V(6). Again, this rule which is intended to 
constrain the use of self-purchase as a takeover defence unless a majority 
of the shareholders consent, provides an additional administrative hurdle 
that must be scaled in order to keep an ongoing on-market programme 
running, where monthly extensions are required under Rule 3V(8)(c) and 
(d). 
Finally, Rule 3V(l 1) requires that where the company lodges a notice 
pursuant to section 133TB of the Corporations Law, it must immediately 
advise the Home Exchange, in respect of any purchase pursuant to an on-
market buy-back scheme, the percentage of issued shares of the class 
which it has purchased and the total number of shares purchased at each 
price paid. Paragraph (b) requires that the Home Exchange be notified at 
the start of the following trading day when any directors and/or their 
associates dispose of shares in the company, and also the names of any 
such directors. The problems noted above in relation to the interests of 
directors changing, particularly through acquisitions or disposals by their 
associates or companies in which they have a significant stake (i.e. related 
parties), would make this requirement very difficult to comply with in the 
context of an ongoing on-market purchase programme. 
As can be seen from the above analysis, while in some circumstances it 
will be possible to run an ongoing on-market purchase programme, the 
legislative and Stock Exchange requirements relating to any such 
programme are complex and administratively daunting. In particular, the 
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six month time limit on such a programme before the whole process has to 
be gone through again, is inappropriate, and the requirement to notify the 
Exchange where a director or an associate sells shares to the company will 
be often extremely difficult to comply with in practice. So, like their 
counterpart provisions in New Zealand, the mosaic of rules relating to a 
potential on-market purchase programme may well be effective to counter 
perceived potential abuses of the share repurchase power, but are 
completely impractical to facilitate a legitimate on-going gearing 
adjustment programme on a stock exchange. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis undertaken in this paper has demonstrated that in relation to 
three transactions which are commonly associated with purchase of own 
shares in overseas jurisdictions, both the New Zealand and Australian 
legislative provisions which govern share buy-backs provide significant, 
and in some instances insuperable, difficulties to those transactions being 
undertaken in New Zealand or Australia. 
In relation to buy-out agreements in closely held companies the above 
analysis has demonstrated that in New Zealand only one method of 
effecting such an agreement is available under the Companies Act 1993 
provisions relating to re-purchase. This is a unanimous shareholder 
agreement under section 107(5)(a). This method is subject to the solvency 
test, which necessarily (and desirably) adds an element of uncertainty 
whether the agreement will be able to be performed at the relevant time. A 
buy-out agreement may also be concluded under the redeemable share 
provisions relating to shares redeemable at the option of the holder, or 
shares redeemable on a certain date. The advantage of the redeemable 
share method is that it is not subject to the solvency test. Rather, if the 
company is insolvent after the redemption then redemption amounts may 
be traced and recovered from departing shareholders. It is submitted that 
in many cases buy-out agreements will continue to be made under the 
redeemable share provisions, as they were before the enactment of the 
Companies Act 1993. 
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In Australia, the Close Corporations Act 1989 is not yet proclaimed to 
come into force. Before examination of its provisions, a reasonable 
expectation would be that this would provide a perfect vehicle for a buy-
out agreement in a closely held company. However, upon examination, it 
does not appear that the Act provides such a method. Turning to the 
substantive share repurchase provisions in Division 4B of Part 2.4 of the 
Corporations Act 1989, neither the buy-back scheme provisions nor the 
targeted offer or employee share purchase provisions are suitable to effect 
buy-back agreements. Like their New Zealand counterparts, these 
provisions contemplate a repurchase in the near future, not the creation of a 
binding obligation to acquire shares of a departing shareholder at some 
time far into the future. It follows that since the share repurchase 
provisions are inappropriate to effect buy-out agreements, then the only 
acceptable option available in Australia will continue to be buy-out 
agreements effected using redeemable preference shares. 
In relation to going private transactions in the New Zealand context, it has 
been demonstrated that the certification and notice provisions are unlikely 
to be effective to prevent abusive going private transactions where an 
insider management/shareholder group wishes to garner future profits of 
the business exclusively for itself. However, where the repurchase 
mechanism is used as a takeover defence, either alone, or as an integral 
part of a scheme to go private then there are real difficulties. The effects 
of hamstringing legitimate takeover defences is that the desirable auction 
feature whereby offeree shareholders through a bid and counter bid 
procedure eventually acquire the best possible price for their shares, is 
stymied. In these circumstances offeree shareholders will have little choice 
but to accept a partial takeover offer at a consideration which they may 
well consider to be unacceptably low. 
In Australia the multitudinous and complex requirements of the repurchase 
provisions provide significant hurdles and difficulties to effecting a going 
private transaction. With great care, going private transactions can be 
effected by insiders, but legitimate takeover defences are likely to be 
hamstrung, in a manner similar to New Zealand, by the extensive notice 
and resolution requirements. 
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In relation to capital market arbitrage transactions, there are significant 
hurdles in New Zealand to an ongoing on-market programme being 
effected, with similar problems being encountered in Australia. 
These difficulties flow from the fact that in both jurisdictions a prescriptive 
approach to the control of share buy-backs has been adopted, whereby the 
most commonly identified abusive features of share repurchase 
transactions have been identified (e.g. selective bail out at an overvalue, 
share price manipulation) and specific requirements included in the 
legislation to prevent such abuses occurring. A consequence of this 
approach is that while the requirements may well be effective to prevent 
the perceived abuses to which share buy-back can be put, they also have 
the effect of preventing, or making very difficult, common transactions 
whose purpose is entirely legitimate. 
The New Zealand provisions appear deceptively simple on their face, but 
the above analysis has demonstrated that the legislation is rife with 
uncertainty and ambiguity in certain important respects. The Australian 
provisions are labyrinthine. One suspects that they will rarely be used, 
because of the very high risk of non-compliance either through confusion 
or genuine oversight. Also, in Australia directors must be responsible for 
solvency declarations for 12 months after they are made and are personally 
liable to indemnify the company for payments made to purchase the 
company's shares if insolvency occurs during this period. Directors are 
unlikely to be willing to exercise the repurchase power under these 
circumstances in all but a few cases. 
The economic costs in having defective share repurchase regimes are 
legion. In New Zealand the ambiguities and inappropriate protective 
mechanisms which surround both potentially abusive, and legitimate 
transactions, are unnecessary and frustrating. The same can be said for the 
highly complex Australian provisions, which should come complete with a 
survival guide. However, the economic effects of such unsuitable regimes 
are not merely limited to added transaction costs. There are also 
significant indirect, and in many cases unquantifiable, costs, involved in 
foregone opportunities to take advantage of the procedure. Two clear 
examples which have arisen from the above analysis are the situation of the 
frustration of legitimate takeover defences, which will have the effect of 
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preventing off eree shareholders from receiving the best price for their 
shares, and also capital market arbitrage transactions, where legitimate 
ongoing on-market gearing adjustment programmes will not be able to be 
effected. The result is that companies will pay more for their funding 
requirements than would otherwise be the case if such an ongoing 
programme could be effected simply and with minimum cost and 
complexity. 
These direct and indirect costs will be directly reflected in the 
competitiveness of companies who would otherwise seek to use the share 
repurchase mechanism to achieve legitimate business purposes. It is 
clearly no answer to say that alternative methods can be found to effect the 
transactions which would otherwise be achievable by share repurchase. 
The point is that inappropriate regimes have been implemented which 
foreclose the possibility of a more efficient use of corporate resources. In 
the global market-place, every company needs an edge. In New Zealand 
and Australia the share repurchase regimes function more as a hammer 
than a wet stone. 
It is submitted that what is required to remedy the defects in the current 
provisions in New Zealand and Australia is not selected amendments (in 
the case of New Zealand) or massive simplification (in Australia). Rather, 
a less prescriptive approach which relies more on a reliance on directors' 
duties to act in good faith in the company's best interests and to act for a 
proper purpose, together with the further facilitation of shareholder 
remedies, is the preferable approach to adopt in relation to share 
repurchases. This is a case where it would be appropriate to throw out the 
bath water and the babies and start again. 
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7. APPENDICES 
A. Matrix chart summarising New Zealand legislative 
conditions re share buy-backs 
B. Matrix chart summarising Australian legislative 
conditions re share buy-backs 
Appendix A 
COMPANY BUY-BACKS UNDER COMPANIES ACT 1993 (NZ) 
CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED 
TYPE OF BUY-BACK 
CONDITIONS PRO-RATA OFFER TARGETED/ ON MARKET ON MARKET 
(SECTION 60(1){a)) SELECTIVE/ PURCHASE >5%/12 PURCHASE <5%/12 
"SPECIAL" OFFER (SECTION 63) (SECTION 65) 
(SECTION 60(1)(b)) 
Authorisation by Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company Constitution s 59( 1) s 59(1) s59( 1) s 59(1) 
Solvency Declaration Yes Yes Yes Yes 
s 52(2) s 52(2) s 52(2) s 52(2) 
Shareholder's Best Yes Yes Yes 
-Interest Declaration (remaining s63( 1 )(b) s 65(1 )(a)(i) 
shareholders only() 
s 61(1)(a) 
Company's Best Interest Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Declarat ion s 60(3)(a) s 60(3)(a) s 63(1 )(b) s 65(1)(a)(i) 
Shareholder Approval All shareholders OR 
follow section 61 
procedure 
s 60(b)(i) or (ii) 
Fair and Reasonable to Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Company s 60(3)(b) s 60(3)(b) s 63(1 )(c) s 65( 1 (a)(ii) 
Fair and Reasonable to Yes Yes 
Company (remaining s 63( 1 )(c) 
shareholders only) 
s 61(1)(b) 
"No Inside Information" Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Declaration s 60(3)(c) s 60(3)(c) s 63(1 ){d) s 65(1)(a)(ii) 
Disclosure Document to Yes Yes Yes 
Shareholders pre-otter pre-offer post aquisition 
s 61(5), 62 s 63(6), 64 s 65(2) 
Objection Procedure 
(Creditors) 
Objection Procedure Yes Yes 
(Shareholders/ Shareholder OR Shareholder OR 
Company) Company Company 
s 61(8)(a) s 63(8) 
Type of 
Buy-Back 
BUY-BACK 
SCHEME 
(Proportional 
offer to all 
sharenolders, 
like Part A 
takeover) 
ON-HARKET 
PURCHASE 
· SELECTIVE 
BUY-BACK 
(Special deal 
with one or more 
shareholders) 
EMPLOYEE 
SHARES 
PURCHASE 
ODD - LOT 
PURCHASE 
Type of 
Buy-Back 
BUY-BACK SCHEME 
(Proportional 
offer to all 
shareholders, 
like ·Part A 
takeover) 
SELECTIVE 
BUY-BACK. 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
PURCHASES 
Appendix B 
AUSTRALIA 
PUBLIC COMPANY BUY-BACKS 
Conditions to be satisfied 
AUTHORISATION AUDITED 10/12 LIMIT SHAREHOLDER CREDITORS' 
IN ARTICLES SOLVENCY APPROVAL OBJECTION 
(Note limited DECLARATION PROCEDURE 
life - s 133DB) 
Yes 
s 133011. 
Yes 
s 133DA 
Yes 
s 133DA 
Yes 
s 133DA 
Yes 
s 133DA 
AUTHORISATION 
IN ARTICLES 
Yes 
s 133DA 
Yes 
s 133DA 
Yes 
s 133DA 
Yes Yes Only if Yes 
s 133MII. s 133EA takeover - s 133LA 
pending 
s 133GA 
Yes Yes 
s 133MB s 133EA 
Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
s 133MB s 133EA special s 133LA 
75/75 majority 
s 133JA 
Yes Yes, unless Only if 10/12 
s 133MB shareholders limit exceeded 
approve s 133HA 
s 133HA 
Yes 
s 133MB 
PROPRIETARY COMPANY BUY-BACKS 
Conditions to be satisfied 
SOLVENCY AUDITED 
DECLARATION SOLVENCY 
Yes 
s 133!1A 
Yes 
s 133MB 
Yes 
s 133MB 
DECLARATION 
If the buy-back 
exceeds the 
10/12 limit 
s 133HA 
If the buy-back 
exceeds the 
10/12 lirllit 
s 133MB 
If the buy-back 
exceeds the 
10/12 limit 
s 133HB 
SHAREHOLDER 
APPROVAL 
Ordinary resolution 
required if: 
- the 10/12 limit is 
exceeded; or 
- a takeover is pending 
or remains open 
s 133GA 
Special 75/75 majority 
if the 10/12 limit 
is exceeded 
s 133JB 
Ordinary resolution 
required if the 10/12 
limit is exceeded 
s 133HA 
Warnick L, Corporations Legislation - Share Buy Backs and Section 129, 
EXPERT 
REPORT 
("Fair & 
Reasonabl 
Yes 
s 133KE 
CREDITORS' 
OBJECTION 
PROCEDURE 
Yes 
s 133LA 
Yes 
s 133LA 
in Conference Papers, Banking Law & Practice 7th Annual Conference - May 1990, 
Melbourne, IBC in association with The Banking Law Association, 122-123. 
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